Related papers: Regret-Minimizing Double Oracle for Extensive-Form…
We extend the classic regret minimization framework for approximating equilibria in normal-form games by greedily weighing iterates based on regrets observed at runtime. Theoretically, our method retains all previous convergence rate…
Group distributionally robust optimization (GDRO) aims to develop models that perform well across $m$ distributions simultaneously. Existing GDRO algorithms can only process a fixed number of samples per iteration, either 1 or $m$, and…
In iterative approaches to empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), the strategy space is expanded incrementally based on analysis of intermediate game models. A common approach to strategy exploration, represented by the double oracle…
We revisit the problem of \textit{online linear optimization} in case the set of feasible actions is accessible through an approximated linear optimization oracle with a factor $\alpha$ multiplicative approximation guarantee. This setting…
An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility…
We consider the problem of minimizing different notions of swap regret in online optimization. These forms of regret are tightly connected to correlated equilibrium concepts in games, and have been more recently shown to guarantee…
We study deception in adversarial graph traversal, where a mobile agent seeks to reach a goal with minimum cost while an adversary alters edge costs to increase the total traversal cost. Unlike prior works that assume fixed…
The congestion game is a powerful model that encompasses a range of engineering systems such as traffic networks and resource allocation. It describes the behavior of a group of agents who share a common set of $F$ facilities and take…
We consider the problem of minimizing a smooth convex function by reducing the optimization to computing the Nash equilibrium of a particular zero-sum convex-concave game. Zero-sum games can be solved using online learning dynamics, where a…
Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game…
In game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their individual interests, so the environment is non-stationary from each player's perspective. In this context, the performance of a learning algorithm is often…
We consider the problem of simultaneous learning in stochastic games with many players in the finite-horizon setting. While the typical target solution for a stochastic game is a Nash equilibrium, this is intractable with many players. We…
In general, two-agent decision-making problems can be modeled as a two-player game, and a typical solution is to find a Nash equilibrium in such game. Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a well-known method to find a Nash…
We study a general version of the adversarial online learning problem. We are given a decision set $\mathcal{X}$ in a reflexive Banach space $X$ and a sequence of reward vectors in the dual space of $X$. At each iteration, we choose an…
Recent simultaneous works by Peng and Rubinstein [2024] and Dagan et al. [2024] have demonstrated the existence of a no-swap-regret learning algorithm that can reach $\epsilon$ average swap regret against an adversary in any extensive-form…
Blackwell approachability is a framework for reasoning about repeated games with vector-valued payoffs. We introduce predictive Blackwell approachability, where an estimate of the next payoff vector is given, and the decision maker tries to…
Partial monitoring is a generic framework of online decision-making problems with limited feedback. To make decisions from such limited feedback, it is necessary to find an appropriate distribution for exploration. Recently, a powerful…
In two-player zero-sum games, if both players minimize their average external regret, then the average of the strategy profiles converges to a Nash equilibrium. For n-player general-sum games, however, theoretical guarantees for regret…
In this paper, a new method is proposed to compute the rolling Nash equilibrium of the time-invariant nonlinear two-person zero-sum differential games. The idea is to discretize the time to transform a differential game into a sequential…
Most of the literature on learning in games has focused on the restrictive setting where the underlying repeated game does not change over time. Much less is known about the convergence of no-regret learning algorithms in dynamic multiagent…