Related papers: Regret-Minimizing Double Oracle for Extensive-Form…

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is an efficient no-regret learning algorithm for decision problems modeled as extensive games. CFR's regret bounds depend on the requirement of perfect recall: players always remember information…

Distributionally robust optimization (DRO) is an effective framework for controlling real-world systems with various uncertainties, typically modeled using distributional uncertainty balls. However, DRO problems often involve infinitely…

The regret bound of dynamic online learning algorithms is often expressed in terms of the variation in the function sequence ($V_T$) and/or the path-length of the minimizer sequence after $T$ rounds. For strongly convex and smooth…

We focus on the design of algorithms for finding equilibria in 2-player zero-sum games. Although it is well known that such problems can be solved by a single linear program, there has been a surge of interest in recent years for simpler…

Under the uncoupled learning setup, the last-iterate convergence guarantee towards Nash equilibrium is shown to be impossible in many games. This work studies the last-iterate convergence guarantee in general games toward rationalizability,…

Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) is an influential algorithm framework for approximating a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in multi-agent non-transitive games. Many previous studies have been trying to promote policy diversity in PSRO. A major…

Constrained Markov decision processes (CMDPs) are a common way to model safety constraints in reinforcement learning. State-of-the-art methods for efficiently solving CMDPs are based on primal-dual algorithms. For these algorithms, all…

We revisit the challenge of designing online algorithms for the bandit convex optimization problem (BCO) which are also scalable to high dimensional problems. Hence, we consider algorithms that are \textit{projection-free}, i.e., based on…

In 1975 the first author proved that every finite tight two-person game form $g$ is Nash-solvable, that is, for every payoffs $u$ and $w$ of two players the obtained game $(g;u,w)$, in normal form, has a Nash equilibrium (NE) in pure…

The paper presents a new method for approximating Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium in general-sum sequential games with imperfect information and perfect recall. The proposed approach is generic as it does not rely on any specific properties…

We study online optimization methods for zero-sum games, a fundamental problem in adversarial learning in machine learning, economics, and many other domains. Traditional methods approximate Nash equilibria (NE) using either regret-based…

We study the decades-old problem of online portfolio management and propose the first algorithm with logarithmic regret that is not based on Cover's Universal Portfolio algorithm and admits much faster implementation. Specifically Universal…

This paper considers no-regret learning for repeated continuous-kernel games with lossy bandit feedback. Since it is difficult to give the explicit model of the utility functions in dynamic environments, the players' action can only be…

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has been able to solve hard problems such as playing Atari games or solving the game of Go, with a unified approach. Yet modern deep RL approaches are still not widely used in real-world applications. One reason…

Follow the regularized leader FTRL is the premier algorithm for online optimization. However, despite decades of research on its convergence in constrained optimization -- and potential games in particular -- its behavior remained hitherto…

We present a simple primal-dual algorithm for computing approximate Nash-equilibria in two-person zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information and perfect recall (like Texas Hold'em Poker). Our algorithm is numerically stable,…

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to…

No-regret learners seek to minimize the difference between the loss they cumulated through the actions they played, and the loss they would have cumulated in hindsight had they consistently modified their behavior according to some strategy…

We study online learning problems in which the learner has extra knowledge about the adversary's behaviour, i.e., in game-theoretic settings where opponents typically follow some no-external regret learning algorithms. Under this…

We consider online convex optimization with a zero-order oracle feedback. In particular, the decision maker does not know the explicit representation of the time-varying cost functions, or their gradients. At each time step, she observes…