Related papers: Player-centered incomplete cooperative games
This paper defines a general class of cooperative games for which the nucleolus is efficiently computable. This class includes new members for which the complexity of computing their nucleolus was not previously known. We show that when the…
In this paper, we consider a generalization of cooperative games to the case where a coalition can distribute the earned utility not only among its members but also to other players. In particular, we consider an example where coalitions…
This paper takes a game theoretical approach to open shop scheduling problems with unit execution times to minimize the sum of completion times. By supposing an initial schedule and associating each job (consisting in a number of…
Over the last few years, the Shapley value, a solution concept from cooperative game theory, has found numerous applications in machine learning. In this paper, we first discuss fundamental concepts of cooperative game theory and axiomatic…
We propose a coalition game model for the problem of communication for omniscience (CO). In this game model, the core contains all achievable rate vectors for CO with sum-rate being equal to a given value. Any rate vector in the core…
We consider the interim core of normal form cooperative games and exchange economies with incomplete information based on the partition model. We develop a solution concept that we can situate roughly between Wilson's coarse core and…
A large branch of explainable machine learning is grounded in cooperative game theory. However, research indicates that game-theoretic explanations may mislead or be hard to interpret. We argue that often there is a critical mismatch…
Cores of cooperative games are ubiquitous in information theory, and arise most frequently in the characterization of fundamental limits in various scenarios involving multiple users. Examples include classical settings in network…
We show how solution concepts in games such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms of \emph{knowledge-based programs}. Intuitively, all solution…
Cooperative game theory methods, notably Shapley values, have significantly enhanced machine learning (ML) interpretability. However, existing explainable AI (XAI) frameworks mainly attribute average model predictions, overlooking…
We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and…
In common-interest stochastic games all players receive an identical payoff. Players participating in such games must learn to coordinate with each other in order to receive the highest-possible value. A number of reinforcement learning…
We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…
Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings,…
Teamwork is vital in many settings, and it is socially beneficial for teams to cooperate in some situations (``good games'') and not in others (``bad games;'' e.g., those that allow for corruption). A team's cooperation in any given game…
This paper investigates the potential benefits of cooperation in scenarios where finitely many agents compete for shared resources, leading to congestion and thereby reduced rewards. By appropriate coordination the members of the…
We present a computational formulation for the approximate version of several variational inequality problems, investigating their computational complexity and establishing PPAD-completeness. Examining applications in computational game…
We consider a two-player zero-sum game with integral payoff and with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff is chosen among a continuous set of possible payoffs. We prove that the value function of this game is solution of an…
The peculiarity of adversarial team games resides in the asymmetric information available to the team members during the play, which makes the equilibrium computation problem hard even with zero-sum payoffs. The algorithms available in the…
A coalition is blameable for an outcome if the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. It has been previously suggested that the cost of prevention, or the cost of sacrifice, can be used to measure the degree of blameworthiness. The paper…