Related papers: Convergence analysis and acceleration of the smoot…
Despite the many recent practical and theoretical breakthroughs in computational game theory, equilibrium finding in extensive-form team games remains a significant challenge. While NP-hard in the worst case, there are provably efficient…
A new algorithm for solving large-scale convex optimization problems with a separable objective function is proposed. The basic idea is to combine three techniques: Lagrangian dual decomposition, excessive gap and smoothing. The main…
While discounted payoff games and classic games that reduce to them, like parity and mean-payoff games, are symmetric, their solutions are not. We have taken a fresh view on the properties that optimal solutions need to have, and devised a…
Imperfect-Information Extensive-Form Games (IIEFGs) is a prevalent model for real-world games involving imperfect information and sequential plays. The Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium (EFCE) has been proposed as a natural solution…
A recent emerging trend in the literature on learning in games has been concerned with providing faster learning dynamics for correlated and coarse correlated equilibria in normal-form games. Much less is known about the significantly more…
We focus on the problem of finding an optimal strategy for a team of two players that faces an opponent in an imperfect-information zero-sum extensive-form game. Team members are not allowed to communicate during play but can coordinate…
Hindsight rationality is an approach to playing general-sum games that prescribes no-regret learning dynamics for individual agents with respect to a set of deviations, and further describes jointly rational behavior among multiple agents…
The existence of simple uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years…
Simple adaptive procedures that converge to correlated equilibria are known to exist for normal form games (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000), but no such analogue exists for extensive-form games. Leveraging inspiration from Zinkevich et al.…
We develop an algorithmic framework for solving convex optimization problems using no-regret game dynamics. By converting the problem of minimizing a convex function into an auxiliary problem of solving a min-max game in a sequential…
Characterizing the performance of no-regret dynamics in multi-player games is a foundational problem at the interface of online learning and game theory. Recent results have revealed that when all players adopt specific learning algorithms,…
This paper presents a new primal-dual method for computing an equilibrium of generalized (continuous) Nash game (referred to as generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP)) where each player's feasible strategy set depends on the other…
Game Theory studies situations in which multiple agents having conflicting objectives have to reach a collective decision. The question of a compact representation language for agents utility function is of crucial importance since the…
In this paper, a new method is proposed to compute the rolling Nash equilibrium of the time-invariant nonlinear two-person zero-sum differential games. The idea is to discretize the time to transform a differential game into a sequential…
The extragradient method has gained popularity due to its robust convergence properties for differentiable games. Unlike single-objective optimization, game dynamics involve complex interactions reflected by the eigenvalues of the game…
Subgame solving is a technique for scaling algorithms to large games by locally refining a precomputed blueprint strategy during gameplay. While straightforward in perfect-information games where search starts from the current state,…
In this paper, we establish efficient and uncoupled learning dynamics so that, when employed by all players in multiplayer perfect-recall imperfect-information extensive-form games, the trigger regret of each player grows as $O(\log T)$…
Regret Matching+ (RM+) and its variants are important algorithms for solving large-scale games. However, a theoretical understanding of their success in practice is still a mystery. Moreover, recent advances on fast convergence in games are…
We consider the problem of minimizing a smooth convex function by reducing the optimization to computing the Nash equilibrium of a particular zero-sum convex-concave game. Zero-sum games can be solved using online learning dynamics, where a…
We extend the classic regret minimization framework for approximating equilibria in normal-form games by greedily weighing iterates based on regrets observed at runtime. Theoretically, our method retains all previous convergence rate…