Related papers: Induced-photorefractive attack against Quantum Key…
We address the question of the implementation of long-distance device-independent quantum key distribution (DI QKD) by proposing two experimentally viable schemes. Those schemes only use spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) sources…
Practical implementations of quantum cryptography use attenuated laser pulses as the signal source rather than single photons. The channels used to transmit are also lossy. Here we give a simple derivation of two beam-splitting attacks on…
The ability of an eavesdropper (Eve) to perform an intercept-resend attack on a free-space quantum key distribution (QKD) receiver by precisely controlling the incidence angle of an attack laser has been previously demonstrated. However,…
Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) have been shown to be subject to various detector side-channel attacks that compromise the promised unconditional security. Most notable is a general class of attacks adopting the…
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) can easily be obscured if the eavesdropper can utilize technical imperfections of the actual implementation. Here we describe and experimentally demonstrate a very simple but highly effective…
Thin-film lithium niobate (LN) photonic integrated circuits (PICs) could enable ultrahigh performance in electro-optic and nonlinear optical devices. To date, realizations have been limited to chip-scale proof-of-concepts. Here we…
Lithium niobate (LN) is a promising material for future complex photonic-electronic circuits, with wide applications in fields like data communications, sensing, optical computation, and quantum optics. There was a great step toward LN…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two parties to establish a secret key over a potentially hostile channel by exchanging photonic quantum states, relying on the fact that it is impossible for an eavesdropper to tap the quantum channel…
Many quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes are based on sending and measuring qubits -- two-dimensional quantum systems. Yet, in practical realizations and experiments, the measuring devices at the receiver's (Bob) site commonly do not…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a provably secure way of generating a secret key, which can later be used for encoding and decoding information. In this paper we analyze the effects of an eavesdropper's variable-strength measurements on…
Lithium niobate-on-insulator (LNOI) is an emerging photonic platform that exhibits favorable material properties (such as low optical loss, strong nonlinearities, and stability) and enables large-scale integration with stronger optical…
Implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) need vulnerability assessment against loopholes in their optical scheme. Most of the optical attacks involve injecting or receiving extraneous light via the communication channel. An…
We present and discuss perspectives of current developments on advanced quantum optical circuits monolithically integrated in the lithium niobate platform. A set of basic components comprising photon pair sources based on parametric down…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides means for unconditional secure key transmission between two distant parties. However, in practical implementations, it suffers from quantum hacking due to device imperfections. Here we propose a…
A simple photon-number splitting attack is described which works on any lossy quantum key distribution system with a multi-photon source independently of the mean source photon number, and with no induced error rate. In particular, it…
The stability of the integrated photonic circuits is of critical importance for many applications that require high frequency precision or robust operation over time, such as optomechanical sensing, frequency conversion, optical…
Quantum noise limits the sensitivity of optical measurements, but squeezed states of light enable quantum-enhanced metrology, sensing, and information processing. Most on-chip squeezed-light sources rely on Kerr ($\chi^{(3)}$)…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security grounded in the fundamental laws of physics. Nevertheless, practical imperfections can introduce side channels that expose QKD systems to quantum hacking, especially…
We investigate the possibility of eavesdropping on a quantum key distribution network by local sequential quantum unsharp measurement attacks by the eavesdropper. In particular, we consider a pure two-qubit state shared between two parties…
We report a new type of vulnerability in practical implementations of quantum key distribution systems. We show that it is possible to increase the pulse energy of a source laser diode not only by injection-locking it by external light near…