Related papers: Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms
The precise design of a system may be considered a trade secret which should be protected, whilst at the same time component manufacturers are sometimes reluctant to release full test data (perhaps only providing mean time to failure data).…
Security, privacy, and fairness have become critical in the era of data science and machine learning. More and more we see that achieving universally secure, private, and fair systems is practically impossible. We have seen for example how…
Recently, the blockchain technique was put in the spotlight as it introduced a systematic approach for multiple parties to reach consensus without needing trust. However, the application of this technique in practice is severely restricted…
Ensuring the integrity of business processes without disclosing confidential business information is a major challenge in inter-organizational processes. This paper introduces a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP)-based approach for the verifiable…
Societies and organizations often fail to surface latent consensus because individuals fear social censure. A manager might suspect a silent majority would offer a criticism, support a change, report a risk, or endorse a policy -- if only…
We propose a protocol based on mechanism design theory and encrypted control to solve average consensus problems among rational and strategic agents while preserving their privacy. The proposed protocol provides a mechanism that…
We study the implementability of stable matchings in a two-sided market model with one-sided incomplete information. Firms' types are publicly known, whereas workers' types are private information. A mechanism generates a matching and…
Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) form a prominent model for uncertainty in sequential decision making. We are interested in constructing algorithms with theoretical guarantees to determine whether the agent has a…
I study a model of advisors with hidden motives: a seller discloses information about an object's value to a potential buyer, who doesn't know the object's value or how profitable the object's sale is to the seller (the seller's motives). I…
We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which…
Entanglement-based attacks, which are subtle and powerful, are usually believed to render quantum bit commitment insecure. We point out that the no-go argument leading to this view implicitly assumes the evidence-of-commitment to be a…
Blockchain consensus is a state whereby each node in a network agrees on the current state of the blockchain. Existing protocols achieve consensus via a contest or voting procedure to select one node as a dictator to propose new blocks.…
If you recommend a product to me and I buy it, how much should you be paid by the seller? And if your sole interest is to maximize the amount paid to you by the seller for a sequence of recommendations, how should you recommend optimally if…
Classical software verification and validation techniques, such as procedural audits, formal methods, or model documentation, are the traditional mechanisms used to achieve the verifiable accountability now required by regulations like the…
We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from truthfully maximizing \emph{any} objective under…
When users exercise data deletion rights under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and similar regulations, mobile network operators face a tradeoff: excessive machine unlearning degrades model accuracy and incurs retraining…
Electronic voting consistently fails to supplant conventional paper ballot due to a plethora of security shortcomings. Not only are traditional voting methods mediocre in terms of convenience and interface, they also encompass…
In this work, we study how to securely evaluate the value of trading data without requiring a trusted third party. We focus on the important machine learning task of classification. This leads us to propose a provably secure four-round…
How best to incentivise prompt disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via…
Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are an emerging technology that has become the solution to efficiently provide security and privacy along with the transparency requirement of blockchains. ZKPs are usually expressed by means of arithmetic…