Related papers: Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms
This paper explores many-to-one matching models, both with and without contracts, where doctors' preferences are private and hospitals' preferences are public and substitutable. It is known that any stable-dominating mechanism --which is…
String commitment schemes are similar to the well studied bit commitment schemes in cryptography with the difference that the committing party, say Alice, is supposed to commit a long string instead of a single bit, to another party say…
Opacity is a generic security property, that has been defined on (non probabilistic) transition systems and later on Markov chains with labels. For a secret predicate, given as a subset of runs, and a function describing the view of an…
We propose a mechanism design framework that incorporates both soft information, which can be freely manipulated, and semi-hard information, which entails a cost for falsification. The framework captures various contexts such as school…
Publicly verifiable delegation is a well-known problem involving a user who wishes to outsource a resource-intensive computational task to a more powerful but potentially untrusted server such that any other party is able to efficiently…
The partial alignment and conflict of autonomous agents lead to mixed-motive scenarios in many real-world applications. However, agents may fail to cooperate in practice even when cooperation yields a better outcome. One well known reason…
We present a publicly-detectable watermarking scheme for LMs: the detection algorithm contains no secret information, and it is executable by anyone. We embed a publicly-verifiable cryptographic signature into LM output using rejection…
Data valuation methods assign marginal utility to each data point that has contributed to the training of a machine learning model. If used directly as a payout mechanism, this creates a hidden cost of valuation, in which contributors with…
Machine learning systems are increasingly used to support public sector decision-making across a variety of sectors. Given concerns around accountability in these domains, and amidst accusations of intentional or unintentional bias, there…
We propose an adversarial learning framework that deals with the privacy-utility tradeoff problem under two types of conditions: data-type ignorant, and data-type aware. Under data-type aware conditions, the privacy mechanism provides a…
In a decision-making scenario, a principal could use conditional predictions from an expert agent to inform their choice. However, this approach would introduce a fundamental conflict of interest. An agent optimizing for predictive accuracy…
Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game outcome is optimal with…
We study repeated resource allocation with strategic agents, where monetary transfers are disallowed and the planner has no prior information on agents' utility distributions. Inspired by the costly state verification literature, we assume…
Good economic mechanisms depend on the preferences of participants in the mechanism. For example, the revenue-optimal auction for selling an item is parameterized by a reserve price, and the appropriate reserve price depends on how much the…
Zero-knowledge circuits are sets of equality constraints over arithmetic expressions interpreted in a prime field; they are used to encode computations in cryptographic zero-knowledge proofs. We make the following contributions to the…
Bridge is among the zero-sum games for which artificial intelligence has not yet outperformed expert human players. The main difficulty lies in the bidding phase of bridge, which requires cooperative decision making under partial…
We study the notion of zero-knowledge secure against quantum polynomial-time verifiers (referred to as quantum zero-knowledge) in the concurrent composition setting. Despite being extensively studied in the classical setting, concurrent…
Permissionless consensus protocols require a scarce resource to regulate leader election and provide Sybil resistance. Existing paradigms such as Proof of Work and Proof of Stake instantiate this scarcity through parallelizable resources…
As artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly integrates into crowdfunding practices, strategic disclosure of AI involvement has become critical. Yet, empirical insights into how different disclosure strategies influence investor decisions…
To achieve common goals, we often use joint commitments. Our commitment helps us to coordinate with our partners and assures them that their cooperative efforts will benefit themselves. However, if one of us can exploit the other's…