Related papers: Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms
A central question of crowd-sourcing is how to elicit expertise from agents. This is even more difficult when answers cannot be directly verified. A key challenge is that sophisticated agents may strategically withhold effort or information…
We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal elicits a message from the agent and then selects a test to give the agent. The agent's true type determines the probability with which he can pass each…
Bit commitment (BC) is an important cryptographic primitive for an agent to convince a mutually mistrustful party that she has already made a binding choice of 0 or 1 but only to reveal her choice at a later time. Ideally, a BC protocol…
Non-binding communication is common in daily life and crucial for fostering cooperation, even though it has no direct payoff consequences. However, despite robust empirical evidence, its evolutionary basis remains poorly understood. Here,…
Information sharing among organizations has been gaining attention as a method for improving cybersecurity. However, the associated disclosure costs act as deterrents for firms' voluntary cooperation. In this work, we take a game-theoretic…
We introduce Info-Commit, an information-theoretic protocol for polynomial commitment and verification. With the help of a trusted initializer, a succinct commitment to a private polynomial $f$ is provided to the user. The user then queries…
User authentication can rely on various factors (e.g., a password, a cryptographic key, biometric data) but should not reveal any secret or private information. This seemingly paradoxical feat can be achieved through zero-knowledge proofs.…
The security of most existing cryptocurrencies is based on a concept called Proof-of-Work, in which users must solve a computationally hard cryptopuzzle to authorize transactions (`one unit of computation, one vote'). This leads to enormous…
We study a market for private data in which a data analyst publicly releases a statistic over a database of private information. Individuals that own the data incur a cost for their loss of privacy proportional to the differential privacy…
Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so…
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…
We propose a middleware solution designed to facilitate seamless integration of privacy using zero-knowledge proofs within various multi-chain protocols, encompassing domains such as DeFi, gaming, social networks, DAOs, e-commerce, and the…
The availability of vast amounts of data is changing how we can make medical discoveries, predict global market trends, save energy, and develop educational strategies. In some settings such as Genome Wide Association Studies or deep…
Zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that allows a prover to convince a verifier of the validity of a statement without leaking any further information. As an efficient variant of ZKP, non-interactive…
Commitments play a crucial role in game theory, shaping strategic interactions by either altering a player's own payoffs or influencing the incentives of others through outcome-contingent payments. While most research has focused on using…
Many users would prefer the privacy of end-to-end encryption in their online communications if it can be done without significant inconvenience. However, because existing key distribution methods cannot be fully trusted enough for automatic…
Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are computationally demanding to generate. Their importance for applications like ZK-Rollups has prompted some to outsource ZKP generation to a market of specialized provers. However, existing market designs…
We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the…
In situations where explicit communication is limited, human collaborators act by learning to: (i) infer meaning behind their partner's actions, and (ii) convey private information about the state to their partner implicitly through…
In this work we construct an alternative model for Authenticated Key Exchange, intended to build a theoretic security framework for protocols whose characteristics may not always concur with the specifics of already existing models for…