Related papers: Proportionality in Approval-Based Participatory Bu…
A Ranked candidate voting method based on Phragmen's procedure is described that can be used to produce a top-down proportional candidate list. The method complies with the Droop proportionality criterion satisfied by Single Transferable…
The goal of this paper is twofold. First and foremost, we aim to experimentally and quantitatively show that the choice of a multiwinner voting rule can play a crucial role on the way minorities are represented. We also test the possibility…
We compare the notions "Decisiveness" and "Success" for certain weighted voting systems and various underlying voting measures. In particular, we compute the success rate for the Shapley-Shubik meassure and, more generally, for Common…
We consider a committee voting on whether to adopt a reform under a quota rule, where members differ in how much they value the reform some supporting it, others opposing it. We examine how members can influence each other's votes through…
Many real-world decision-making problems involve optimizing multiple objectives simultaneously, rendering the selection of the most preferred solution a non-trivial problem: All Pareto optimal solutions are viable candidates, and it is…
A formalized and quantifiable responsibility score is a crucial component in many aspects of the development and application of multi-agent systems and autonomous agents. We can employ it to inform decision making processes based on ethical…
We provide a formal framework accounting for a widespread idea in the theory of economic design: analytically established incompatibilities between given axioms should be qualified by the likelihood of their violation. We define the degree…
Standard approaches to probabilistic reasoning require that one possesses an explicit model of the distribution in question. But, the empirical learning of models of probability distributions from partial observations is a problem for which…
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…
In this paper, we propose a novel fairness framework grounded in the concept of happiness, a measure of the utility each group gains fromdecisionoutcomes. Bycapturingfairness through this intuitive lens, we not only offer a more…
When selecting multiple candidates based on approval preferences of agents, the proportional representation of agents' opinions is an important and well-studied desideratum. Existing criteria for evaluating the representativeness of…
We study the robustness of approval-based participatory budgeting (PB) rules to random noise in the votes. Our contributions are twofold. First, we study the computational complexity of the #Flip-Bribery problem, where given a PB instance…
The paper considers the problem of finding the number of dominant voters in two-level voting procedures. At the first stage, voting is conducted among local groups of voters, and at the second stage, the results are aggregated to form a…
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a form of citizen participation that allows citizens to decide how public funds are spent. Through an election, citizens express their preferences on various projects (spending proposals). A voting mechanism…
In the context of computational social choice, we study voting methods that assign a set of winners to each profile of voter preferences. A voting method satisfies the property of positive involvement (PI) if for any election in which a…
Recently, scholars from law and political science have introduced metrics which use only election outcomes (and not district geometry) to assess the presence of partisan gerrymandering. The most high-profile example of such a tool is the…
Voting is a very general method of preference aggregation. A voting rule takes as input every voter's vote (typically, a ranking of the alternatives), and produces as output either just the winning alternative or a ranking of the…
Emerging methods for participatory algorithm design have proposed collecting and aggregating individual stakeholder preferences to create algorithmic systems that account for those stakeholders' values. Using algorithmic student assignment…
We study the voting problem with two alternatives where voters' preferences depend on a not-directly-observable state variable. While equilibria in the one-round voting mechanisms lead to a good decision, they are usually hard to compute…
We study the collective schedules problem, which consists in computing a one machine schedule of a set of tasks, knowing that a set of individuals (also called voters) have preferences regarding the order of the execution of the tasks. Our…