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Weighted Majority Voting (WMV) is a well-known optimal decision rule for collective decision making, given the probability of sources to provide accurate information (trustworthiness). However, in reality, the trustworthiness is not a known…
When aggregating preferences of agents via voting, two desirable goals are to incentivize agents to participate in the voting process and then identify outcomes that are Pareto efficient. We consider participation as formalized by Brandl,…
As the world's democratic institutions are challenged by dissatisfied citizens, political scientists and also computer scientists have proposed and analyzed various (innovative) methods to select representative bodies, a crucial task in…
We consider the problem of testing whether the points in a complex or real variety with non-zero coordinates form a multiplicative group or, more generally, a coset of a multiplicative group. For the coset case, we study the notion of…
We prove axiomatic characterizations of several important multiwinner rules within the class of approval-based committee choice rules. These are voting rules that return a set of (fixed-size) committees. In particular, we provide axiomatic…
A tournament organizer must select one of $n$ possible teams as the winner of a competition after observing all $\binom{n}{2}$ matches between them. The organizer would like to find a tournament rule that simultaneously satisfies the…
In this paper we consider Tyler's robust covariance M-estimator under group symmetry constraints. We assume that the covariance matrix is invariant to the conjugation action of a unitary matrix group, referred to as group symmetry. Examples…
Condorcet's Jury Theorem has been invoked for ensemble classifiers to indicate that the combination of many classifiers can have better predictive performance than a single classifier. Such a theoretical underpinning is unknown for…
Consider elections where the set of candidates is partitioned into parties, and each party must nominate exactly one candidate. The Possible President problem asks whether some candidate of a given party can become the winner of the…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…
Variable selection can be performed by testing conditional independence (CI) between each predictor and the response, given the other predictors. A doubly robust and powerful option for these CI tests is the projected covariance measure…
The apportionment problem constitutes a fundamental problem in democratic societies: How to distribute a fixed number of seats among a set of states in proportion to the states' populations? This--seemingly simple--task has led to a rich…
We initiate the work towards a comprehensive picture of the smoothed satisfaction of voting axioms, to provide a finer and more realistic foundation for comparing voting rules. We adopt the smoothed social choice framework, where an…
Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a policymaker (or social planner) faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective (or social), system-wide decision. One of the most important…
We consider the problem of electing a committee of $k$ candidates, subject to some constraints as to what this committee is supposed to look like. In our framework, the candidates are given labels as an abstraction of a politician's…
Typical voting rules do not work well in settings with many candidates. If there are just several hundred candidates, then even a simple task such as choosing a top candidate becomes impractical. Motivated by the hope of developing group…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over…
Peer reviews, evaluations, and selections are a fundamental aspect of modern science. Funding bodies the world over employ experts to review and select the best proposals from those submitted for funding. The problem of peer selection,…
We investigate how robust the results of committee elections are to small changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules the effect of making a single swap of adjacent candidates…