Axiomatic characterizations of consistent approval-based committee choice rules
Computer Science and Game Theory
2023-09-22 v2
Abstract
We prove axiomatic characterizations of several important multiwinner rules within the class of approval-based committee choice rules. These are voting rules that return a set of (fixed-size) committees. In particular, we provide axiomatic characterizations of Proportional Approval Voting, the Chamberlin--Courant rule, and other Thiele methods. These rules share the important property that they satisfy an axiom called consistency, which is crucial in our characterizations.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2112.10407,
title = {Axiomatic characterizations of consistent approval-based committee choice rules},
author = {Martin Lackner and Piotr Skowron},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2112.10407},
year = {2023}
}
Comments
We were made aware of a gap in the proof of Theorem 1 (we do not show transitivity of the constructed ranking, Def. 1). We withdraw the paper for now