Related papers: Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk
In this paper, we study a model of communication under adversarial noise. In this model, the adversary makes online decisions on whether to corrupt a transmitted bit based on only the value of that bit. Like the usual binary symmetric…
We consider the disclosure problem of a sender with a large data set of hard evidence who wants to persuade a receiver to take higher actions. Because the receiver will make inferences based on the distribution of the data they see, the…
A security measure called effective security is defined that includes strong secrecy and stealth communication. Effective secrecy ensures that a message cannot be deciphered and that the presence of meaningful communication is hidden. To…
We consider a monopoly information holder selling information to a budget-constrained decision maker, who may benefit from the seller's information. The decision maker has a utility function that depends on his action and an uncertain state…
We study a continuous time economy where agents have asymmetric information. The informed agent (``$I$''), at time zero, receives a private signal about the risky assets' terminal payoff $\Psi(X_T)$, while the uninformed agent (``$U$'') has…
Consider an analyst who models a strategic situation using an incomplete information game. The true game may involve correlated, duplicated belief hierarchies, but the analyst lacks knowledge of the correlation structure and can only…
We focus on robust, survivable communication networks, where network links and nodes are affected by an uncertainty set. In this sense, any network links might fail. Besides, a signal can only travel a maximum distance before its quality…
Real-world applications require RL algorithms to act safely. During learning process, it is likely that the agent executes sub-optimal actions that may lead to unsafe/poor states of the system. Exploration is particularly brittle in…
We consider the theoretical problem of designing an optimal adversarial attack on a decision system that maximally degrades the achievable performance of the system as measured by the mutual information between the degraded signal and the…
A sender persuades a strategically naive decisionmaker (DM) by committing privately to an experiment. Sender's choice of experiment is unknown to the DM, who must form her posterior beliefs nonparametrically by applying some learning rule…
We consider the model of cooperative learning via distributed non-Bayesian learning, where a network of agents tries to jointly agree on a hypothesis that best described a sequence of locally available observations. Building upon recently…
We propose a distributionally robust model for the influence maximization problem. Unlike the classic independent cascade model \citep{kempe2003maximizing}, this model's diffusion process is adversarially adapted to the choice of seed set.…
This paper studies a robust utility maximization problem for intractable claims under distributional ambiguity, where the distribution of the claim cannot be inferred from market information and its dependence with tradable assets is…
During an epidemic, the information available to individuals in the society deeply influences their belief of the epidemic spread, and consequently the preventive measures they take to stay safe from the infection. In this paper, we develop…
In this paper we focus on the estimation of mutual information from finite samples $(\mathcal{X}\times\mathcal{Y})$. The main concern with estimations of mutual information is their robustness under the class of transformations for which it…
We analyze strategic communication when advice is generated by a reinforcement-learning algorithm rather than by a fully rational sender. Building on the cheap-talk framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982), an advisor adapts its messages…
We investigate the capacity of opportunistic communication in the presence of dynamic and distributed spectral activity, i.e. when the time varying spectral holes sensed by the cognitive transmitter are correlated but not identical to those…
We theoretically analyse the limits of robustness to test-time adversarial and noisy examples in classification. Our work focuses on deriving bounds which uniformly apply to all classifiers (i.e all measurable functions from features to…
This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…
Linear contracts are ubiquitous in practice, yet optimal contract theory often prescribes complex, nonlinear structures. We provide a distributional robustness justification for linear contracts. We study a principal-agent problem where the…