Related papers: Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk

In this paper, a generalization of the traditional point-to-point to communication setup, which is named as "reliable communications with asymmetric codebooks", is proposed. Under the assumption of independent identically distributed…

This paper studies the design of an optimal privacyaware estimator of a public random variable based on noisy measurements which contain private information. The public random variable carries non-private information, however, its estimate…

We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the…

This paper studies information transmission from multiple senders who compete for the attention of a decision maker. Each sender is partially informed about the state of the world and decides how to reveal her information over time to…

The buying and selling of information is taking place at a scale unprecedented in the history of commerce, thanks to the formation of online marketplaces for user data. Data providing agencies sell user information to advertisers to allow…

We study the problem of selling information to a data-buyer who faces a decision problem under uncertainty. We consider the classic Bayesian decision-theoretic model pioneered by [Blackwell, 1951, 1953]. Initially, the data buyer has only…

This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests…

We consider a dynamic moral hazard problem between a principal and an agent, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of…

This work studies the distributionally robust evaluation of expected values over temporal data. A set of alternative measures is characterized by the causal optimal transport. We prove the strong duality and recast the causality constraint…

This paper proposes the notion of robust PBE in a general competing mechanism game of incomplete information where a mechanism allows its designer to send a message to himself at the same time agents send messages. It identifies the utility…

This work investigates a dynamic variant of Bayesian persuasion, in which a strategic sender seeks to influence a receiver's belief over time through controlling the timing of the information disclosure, under resource constraints. We…

A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…

How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by…

For the multiterminal secret key agreement problem under a private source model, it is known that the maximum key rate, i.e., the secrecy capacity, can be achieved through communication for omniscience, but the omniscience strategy can be…

This paper studies the problem of secure communication over the broadcast channel with receiver side information under the lens of individual secrecy constraints. That is, the transmitter wants to send two independent messages to two…

We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who…

I describe a Bayesian persuasion problem where Receiver has a private type representing a cutoff for choosing Sender's preferred action, and Sender has maxmin preferences over all Receiver type distributions with known mean and bounds. This…

We study linguistic indirectness when speakers attend to social ties. Social ties are modeled by a graph, and conferences are the sets of nodes that hear a message. Conference worth is a distance polynomial on the graph; allocations are…

I consider an environment in which a decision maker faces uncertainty and privately holds information in the form of a signal about the true state of the world. The decision maker purchases additional information from a data broker before…

We consider a persuasion problem between a sender and a receiver whose utility may be nonlinear in her belief; we call such receivers risk-conscious. Such utility models arise when the receiver exhibits systematic biases away from…