Related papers: Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk
This paper studies a stylized model of a monopoly data seller when information-sharing network exists among data buyers. We show that, if the buyers' prior information is sufficiently noisy, the optimal selling strategy is characterized by…
Bayesian persuasion and its derived information design problem has been one of the main research agendas in the economics and computation literature over the past decade. However, when attempting to apply its model and theory, one is often…
Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure…
We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. Outcomes with excessive randomization are inefficient: generically, the total number of action profiles across states must be strictly…
Correlated equilibria enable a coordinator to influence the self-interested agents by recommending actions that no player has an incentive to deviate from. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism relies on accurate knowledge of the…
We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that…
We develop a novel framework for costly information acquisition in which a decision-maker learns about an unobserved state by choosing a signal distribution, with the cost of information determined by the distribution of noise in the…
We consider a 1-to-$K$ communication scenario, where a source transmits private messages to $K$ receivers through a broadcast erasure channel, and the receivers feed back strictly causally and publicly their channel states after each…
We study computational questions in a game-theoretic model that, in particular, aims to capture advertising/persuasion applications such as viral marketing. Specifically, we consider a multi-agent Bayesian persuasion model where an informed…
In secure multiparty computation (MPC), mutually distrusting users collaborate to compute a function of their private data without revealing any additional information about their data to other users. While it is known that information…
A principal and $n\ge 2$ agents can launch a project if the principal proposes it and at least $k$ agents accept. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an ex ante unknown state. The principal can conduct a test to learn about…
Machine learning models are vulnerable to both security attacks (e.g., adversarial examples) and privacy attacks (e.g., private attribute inference). We take the first step to mitigate both the security and privacy attacks, and maintain…
We study collusion in a second-price auction with two bidders in a dynamic environment. One bidder can make a take-it-or-leave-it collusion proposal, which consists of both an offer and a request of bribes, to the opponent. We show that…
A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…
An epidemic spreading in a network calls for a decision on the part of the network members: They should decide whether to protect themselves or not. Their decision depends on the trade-off between their perceived risk of being infected and…
Bayesian persuasion, an extension of cheap-talk communication, involves an informed sender committing to a signaling scheme to influence a receiver's actions. Compared to cheap talk, this sender's commitment enables the receiver to verify…
Agents receive private signals about an unknown state. The resulting joint belief distributions are complex and lack a simple characterization. Our key insight is that, when conditioned on the state, the structure of belief distributions…
We introduce a model of sender-receiver stopping games, where the state of the world follows an iid--process throughout the game. At each period, the sender observes the current state, and sends a message to the receiver, suggesting either…
We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally…
Information-theoretic secrecy, in particular the wiretap channel formulation, provides protection against interception of a message by adversary Eve and has been widely studied in the last two decades. In contrast, covert communications…