Related papers: Proportional Fairness in Obnoxious Facility Locati…

This paper studies algorithmic fairness when the protected attribute is location. To handle protected attributes that are continuous, such as age or income, the standard approach is to discretize the domain into predefined groups, and…

We consider $k$-Facility Location games, where $n$ strategic agents report their locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to $k\ge 2$ facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize her distance to the nearest facility. We are…

We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over…

Facility location problems often permit facilities to be located at any position. But what if this is not the case in practice? What if facilities can only be located at particular locations like a highway exit or close to a bus stop? We…

Algorithmic decision making systems are ubiquitous across a wide variety of online as well as offline services. These systems rely on complex learning methods and vast amounts of data to optimize the service functionality, satisfaction of…

We initiate the study of mechanism design with outliers, where the designer can discard $z$ agents from the social cost objective. This setting is particularly relevant when some agents exhibit extreme or atypical preferences. As a natural…

We consider matroid allocation problems under opportunity fairness constraints: resources need to be allocated to a set of agents under matroid constraints (which include classical problems such as bipartite matching). Agents are divided…

We study the mechanism design problem of facility location on a metric space in the learning-augmented framework, where mechanisms have access to imperfect predictions of the optimal facility locations. Our objective is to design…

We consider the problem of locating a single facility on the real line. This facility serves a set of agents, each of whom is located on the line, and incurs a cost equal to his distance from the facility. An agent's location is private…

We consider K-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations in a metric space, and a mechanism maps them to K facilities. Our main result is an elegant characterization of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms…

Fairness and privacy are two important concerns in social decision-making processes such as resource allocation. We study privacy in the fair allocation of indivisible resources using the well-established framework of differential privacy.…

We study mechanism design problems in the {\em ordinal setting} wherein the preferences of agents are described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to specific numerical values associated with them. This setting is relevant when agents…

We study a constrained distributed heterogeneous two-facility location problem, where a set of agents with private locations on the real line are divided into disjoint groups. The constraint means that the facilities can only be built in a…

We study a distributed facility location problem in which a set of agents, each with a private position on the real line, is partitioned into a collection of fixed, disjoint groups. The goal is to open $k$ facilities at locations chosen…

In this work, we revisit the problem of fairly allocating a number of indivisible items that are located on a line to multiple agents. A feasible allocation requires that the allocated items to each agent are connected on the line. The…

We study the distributed facility location games with candidate locations, where agents on a line are partitioned into groups. Both desirable and obnoxious facility location settings are discussed. In distributed location problems,…

We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic facility location models with non-strategic clients that…

Restless and collapsing bandits are often used to model budget-constrained resource allocation in settings where arms have action-dependent transition probabilities, such as the allocation of health interventions among patients. However,…

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility…

In the one-dimensional facility assignment problem, m facilities and n agents are positioned along the real line. Each agent will be assigned to a single facility to receive service. Each facility incurs a building cost, which is shared…