Related papers: Revisiting the Distortion of Distributed Voting
We study the distributed facility location games with candidate locations, where agents on a line are partitioned into groups. Both desirable and obnoxious facility location settings are discussed. In distributed location problems,…
We consider the notions of agreement, diversity, and polarization in ordinal elections (that is, in elections where voters rank the candidates). While (computational) social choice offers good measures of agreement between the voters, such…
A voting center is in charge of collecting and aggregating voter preferences. In an iterative process, the center sends comparison queries to voters, requesting them to submit their preference between two items. Voters might discuss the…
In some rate-distortion-type problems, the required fidelity of information is affected by past actions. As a result, the distortion function depends not only on the instantaneous distortion between a source symbol and its representation…
Democratic societies increasingly rely on communication networks to aggregate citizen preferences and information, yet these same networks can systematically mislead voters under certain conditions. We introduce an agent-based model that…
In district-based multi-party elections, electors cast votes in their respective districts. In each district, the party with maximum votes wins the corresponding seat in the governing body. Election Surveys try to predict the election…
Redistricting plays a central role in shaping how votes are translated into political power. While existing computational methods primarily aim to generate large ensembles of legally valid districting plans, they often neglect the strategic…
Randomization is a powerful tool that endows algorithms with remarkable properties. For instance, randomized algorithms excel in adversarial settings, often surpassing the worst-case performance of deterministic algorithms with large…
In many institutional settings, $k$ items are selected with the goal of representing the underlying distribution of claims, opinions, or characteristics in a large population. We study environments with two adversarial parties whose…
Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party (an attacker) attempts to manipulate the election outcome in…
In this paper we examine a variant of the voter model on a dynamically changing network where agents have the option of changing their friends rather than changing their opinions. We analyse, in the context of dense random graphs, two…
Integrity of elections is vital to democratic systems, but it is frequently threatened by malicious actors. The study of algorithmic complexity of the problem of manipulating election outcomes by changing its structural features is known as…
We study social choice mechanisms in an implicit utilitarian framework with a metric constraint, where the goal is to minimize \textit{Distortion}, the worst case social cost of an ordinal mechanism relative to underlying cardinal…
Low isometric distortion is often required for mesh parameterizations. A configuration of some vertices, where the distortion is concentrated, provides a way to mitigate isometric distortion, but determining the number and placement of…
We provide a unifying framework for distributed convex optimization over time-varying networks, in the presence of constraints and uncertainty, features that are typically treated separately in the literature. We adopt a proximal…
Recent works have studied the design of algorithms for selecting representative sortition panels. However, the most central question remains unaddressed: Do these panels reflect the entire population's opinion? We present a positive answer…
This paper considers the scenario in which there are multiple institutions, each with a limited capacity for candidates, and candidates, each with preferences over the institutions. A central entity evaluates the utility of each candidate…
Representative democracy in the United States relies on election systems that transmit votes into representatives in three key bodies: the two chambers of the federal legislature (House of Representatives and Senate) and the Electoral…
We study the voting problem with two alternatives where voters' preferences depend on a not-directly-observable state variable. While equilibria in the one-round voting mechanisms lead to a good decision, they are usually hard to compute…
Much of the theoretical work on strategic voting makes strong assumptions about what voters know about the voting situation. A strategizing voter is typically assumed to know how other voters will vote and to know the rules of the voting…