Related papers: Revisiting the Distortion of Distributed Voting
We consider the following well-studied problem of metric distortion in social choice. Suppose we have an election with $n$ voters and $m$ candidates located in a shared metric space. We would like to design a voting rule that chooses a…
Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a policymaker (or social planner) faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective (or social), system-wide decision. One of the most important…
In many practical scenarios, a population is divided into disjoint groups for better administration, e.g., electorates into political districts, employees into departments, students into school districts, and so on. However, grouping people…
We study low sample complexity mechanisms in participatory budgeting (PB), where each voter votes for a preferred allocation of funds to various projects, subject to project costs and total spending constraints. We analyze the distortion…
In a setting where $m$ items need to be partitioned among $n$ agents, we evaluate the performance of mechanisms that take as input each agent's \emph{ordinal preferences}, i.e., their ranking of the items from most- to least-preferred. The…
In a district-based election, we apply a voting rule $r$ to decide the winners in each district, and a candidate who wins in a maximum number of districts is the winner of the election. We present efficient sampling-based algorithms to…
A voting rule decides on a probability distribution over a set of m alternatives, based on rankings of those alternatives provided by agents. We assume that agents have cardinal utility functions over the alternatives, but voting rules have…
We study a model of temporal voting where there is a fixed time horizon, and at each round the voters report their preferences over the available candidates and a single candidate is selected. Prior work has adapted popular notions of…
Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly. The…
In voting with ranked ballots, each agent submits a strict ranking of the form $a \succ b \succ c \succ d$ over the alternatives, and the voting rule decides on the winner based on these rankings. Although this ballot format has desirable…
We present an alternative voting system that aims at bridging the gap between proportional representative systems and majoritarian, single winner election systems. The system lets people vote for multiple parties, but then assigns each…
We study matching settings in which a set of agents have private utilities over a set of items. Each agent reports a partition of the items into approval sets of different threshold utility levels. Given this limited information on input,…
Agents that learn to select optimal actions represent a prominent focus of the sequential decision-making literature. In the face of a complex environment or constraints on time and resources, however, aiming to synthesize such an optimal…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
In multiwinner approval elections with many candidates, voters may struggle to determine their preferences over the entire slate of candidates. It is therefore of interest to explore which (if any) fairness guarantees can be provided under…
The major finding, of this article, is an ensemble method, but more exactly, a novel, better ranked voting system (and other variations of it), that aims to solve the problem of finding the best candidate to represent the voters. We have…
In distributed processing, agents generally collect data generated by the same underlying unknown model (represented by a vector of parameters) and then solve an estimation or inference task cooperatively. In this paper, we consider the…
Understanding political phenomena requires measuring the political preferences of society. We introduce a model based on mixtures of spatial voting models that infers the underlying distribution of political preferences of voters with only…
We consider a social choice problem where only a small number of people out of a large population are sufficiently available or motivated to vote. A common solution to increase participation is to allow voters use a proxy, that is, transfer…
We consider the problem of multi-choice majority voting in a network of $n$ agents where each agent initially selects a choice from a set of $K$ possible choices. The agents try to infer the choice in majority merely by performing local…