Related papers: Adapting to game trees in zero-sum imperfect infor…

In this paper we investigate the Follow the Regularized Leader dynamics in sequential imperfect information games (IIG). We generalize existing results of Poincar\'e recurrence from normal-form games to zero-sum two-player imperfect…

We study how to learn $\epsilon$-optimal strategies in zero-sum imperfect information games (IIG) with trajectory feedback. In this setting, players update their policies sequentially based on their observations over a fixed number of…

This paper resolves the open question of designing near-optimal algorithms for learning imperfect-information extensive-form games from bandit feedback. We present the first line of algorithms that require only…

Follow the regularized leader FTRL is the premier algorithm for online optimization. However, despite decades of research on its convergence in constrained optimization -- and potential games in particular -- its behavior remained hitherto…

We study the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) in an imperfect information game (IIG) through self-play. Precisely, we focus on two-player, zero-sum, episodic, tabular IIG under the perfect-recall assumption where the only…

We consider prediction with expert advice when data are generated from distributions varying arbitrarily within an unknown constraint set. This semi-adversarial setting includes (at the extremes) the classical i.i.d. setting, when the…

In this paper, we formulate inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) as an expert-learner interaction whereby the optimal performance intent of an expert or target agent is unknown to a learner agent. The learner observes the states and…

We consider learning to play multiplayer imperfect-information games with simultaneous moves and large state-action spaces. Previous attempts to tackle such challenging games have largely focused on model-free learning methods, often…

Imperfect-information games (IIGs) are challenging, as players must make decisions without fully observing the true game state. While AlphaZero has achieved remarkable success in perfect-information games, extending it to IIGs remains…

In imperfect information games, the evaluation of a game state not only depends on the observable world but also relies on hidden parts of the environment. As accessing the obstructed information trivialises state evaluations, one approach…

This paper studies the optimistic variant of Fictitious Play for learning in two-player zero-sum games. While it is known that Optimistic FTRL -- a regularized algorithm with a bounded stepsize parameter -- obtains constant regret in this…

In this paper, several techniques for learning game state evaluation functions by reinforcement are proposed. The first is a generalization of tree bootstrapping (tree learning): it is adapted to the context of reinforcement learning…

Neural network supported tree-search has shown strong results in a variety of perfect information multi-agent tasks. However, the performance of these methods on partial information games has generally been below competing approaches. Here…

The long-run behavior of multi-agent learning - and, in particular, no-regret learning - is relatively well-understood in potential games, where players have aligned interests. By contrast, in harmonic games - the strategic counterpart of…

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with $K$ time steps and a player action space of size $U$, the game tree complexity is $U^{2K}$, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite $(U,K)$,…

Follow-The-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) is known as an effective and versatile approach in online learning, where appropriate choice of the learning rate is crucial for smaller regret. To this end, we formulate the problem of adjusting FTRL's…

Follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) algorithms have become popular in the context of games, providing easy-to-implement methods for each agent, as well as theoretical guarantees that the strategies of all agents will converge to some…

In the past decade, motivated by the putative failure of naive self-play deep reinforcement learning (DRL) in adversarial imperfect-information games, researchers have developed numerous DRL algorithms based on fictitious play (FP), double…

No-regret learning has a long history of being closely connected to game theory. Recent works have devised uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that, when adopted by all the players in normal-form games, converge to various equilibrium…

Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's…