Related papers: School Choice with Farsighted Students
A multi-task learning (MTL) system aims at solving multiple related tasks at the same time. With a fixed model capacity, the tasks would be conflicted with each other, and the system usually has to make a trade-off among learning all of…
We study the strategic simplicity of stable matching mechanisms where one side has fixed preferences, termed priorities. Specifically, we ask which priorities are such that the strategyproofness of deferred acceptance (DA) can be recognized…
The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed and applied to many real-life application domains. As the theory has been applied to increasingly diverse types of environments, researchers and practitioners have encountered…
TPC (Three-Phase Consolidation) is here introduced as a simple but effective approach to continually learn new classes (and/or instances of known classes) while controlling forgetting of previous knowledge. Each experience (a.k.a. task) is…
Visual tracking is typically solved as a discriminative learning problem that usually requires high-quality samples for online model adaptation. It is a critical and challenging problem to evaluate the training samples collected from…
We study the classical assignment problem with initial endowments in a probabilistic framework. In this setting, each agent initially owns an object and has strict preferences over the entire set of objects, and the goal is to reassign…
The school choice problem concerns the design and implementation of matching mechanisms that produce school assignments for students within a given public school district. Previously considered criteria for evaluating proposed mechanisms…
We study the implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules via simply dominant mechanisms (Pycia and Troyan, 2019) in the context of assignment problems, where agents are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and…
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school-choice mechanism? Studying the outcomes of sincere and sophisticated students under the manipulable Boston Mechanism as compared with the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance, we provide…
In school districts where assignments are exclusively determined by a clearinghouse students can only appeal their assignment with a valid reason. An assignment is incontestable if it is appeal-proof. We study incontestability when students…
The three most common school choice mechanisms are the Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA), the classic Boston mechanism (BM), and a variant of the Boston mechanism where students automatically skip exhausted schools, which we call the…
We study the problem of fair cohort selection from an unknown population, with a focus on university admissions. We start with the one-shot setting, where the admission policy must be fixed in advance and remain transparent, before…
Transient stability and critical clearing time (CCT) are important concepts in power system protection and control. This paper explores and compares various learning-based methods for predicting CCT under uncertainties arising from…
This article proposes a characterization of admissions markets that can predict the distribution of students at each school or college under both centralized and decentralized admissions paradigms. The characterization builds on recent…
In the {\sc Course Allocation} problem, there are a set of students and a set of courses at a given university. University courses may have different numbers of credits, typically related to different numbers of learning hours, and there…
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…
We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the…
We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…
This paper introduces a unified framework for stable matching, which nests the traditional definition of stable matching in finite markets and the continuum definition of stable matching from Azevedo and Leshno (2016) as special cases.…
We study the random walk problem on a deterministic scale-free network, in the presence of a set of static, identical targets; due to the strong inhomogeneity of the underlying structure the mean first-passage time (MFPT), meant as a…