Related papers: Utility-Based Communication Requirements for Stabl…
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a…
The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has driven progress in reasoning tasks -- from program synthesis to scientific hypothesis generation -- yet their ability to handle ranked preferences and structured algorithms in combinatorial…
We study the problem of online learning in competitive settings in the context of two-sided matching markets. In particular, one side of the market, the agents, must learn about their preferences over the other side, the firms, through…
We study stable matching problems with locality of information and control. In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This…
We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…
We study the problem of pure exploration in matching markets under uncertain preferences, where the goal is to identify a stable matching with confidence parameter $\delta$ and minimal sample complexity. Agents learn preferences via…
We study matching markets with ties, where workers on one side of the market may have tied preferences over jobs, determined by their matching utilities. Unlike classical two-sided markets with strict preferences, no single stable matching…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…
The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal preferences, finding a maximum-size stable matching is…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…
In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly, a…
We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…
We study the implementability of stable matchings in a two-sided market model with one-sided incomplete information. Firms' types are publicly known, whereas workers' types are private information. A mechanism generates a matching and…
In many two-sided labor markets, interviews are conducted before matches are formed. The growing number of interviews in medical residency markets has increased demand for signaling mechanisms, where applicants send a limited number of…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
Efficient computability is an important property of solution concepts in matching markets. We consider the computational complexity of finding and verifying various solution concepts in trading networks-multi-sided matching markets with…
In this paper, we study the robust consensus problem for a set of discrete-time linear agents to coordinate over an uncertain communication network, which is to achieve consensus against the transmission errors and noises resulted from the…