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Matching Markets Meet LLMs: Algorithmic Reasoning with Ranked Preferences

Artificial Intelligence 2025-12-09 v2 Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics

Abstract

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has driven progress in reasoning tasks -- from program synthesis to scientific hypothesis generation -- yet their ability to handle ranked preferences and structured algorithms in combinatorial domains remains underexplored. We study matching markets, a core framework behind applications like resource allocation and ride-sharing, which require reconciling individual ranked preferences to ensure stable outcomes. We evaluate several state-of-the-art models on a hierarchy of preference-based reasoning tasks -- ranging from stable-matching generation to instability detection, instability resolution, and fine-grained preference queries -- to systematically expose their logical and algorithmic limitations in handling ranked inputs. Surprisingly, even top-performing models with advanced reasoning struggle to resolve instability in large markets, often failing to identify blocking pairs or execute algorithms iteratively. We further show that parameter-efficient fine-tuning (LoRA) significantly improves performance in small markets, but fails to bring about a similar improvement on large instances, suggesting the need for more sophisticated strategies to improve LLMs' reasoning with larger-context inputs.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2506.04478,
  title  = {Matching Markets Meet LLMs: Algorithmic Reasoning with Ranked Preferences},
  author = {Hadi Hosseini and Samarth Khanna and Ronak Singh},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.04478},
  year   = {2025}
}
R2 v1 2026-07-01T03:00:09.133Z