Related papers: Utility-Based Communication Requirements for Stabl…
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a…
In stable matching, one must find a matching between two sets of agents, commonly men and women, or job applicants and job positions. Each agent has a preference ordering over who they want to be matched with. Moreover a matching is said to…
Recent studies on many-to-one matching markets have explored agents with flexible capacity and truthful preference reporting, focusing on mechanisms that jointly design capacities and select a matching. However, in real-world applications…
Posted price mechanisms are prevalent in allocating goods within online marketplaces due to their simplicity and practical efficiency. We explore a fundamental scenario where buyers' valuations are independent and identically distributed,…
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…
Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an…
We study dynamic matching in an infinite-horizon stochastic market. While all agents are potentially compatible with each other, some are hard-to-match and others are easy-to-match. Agents prefer to be matched as soon as possible and…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…
In this paper, we consider the communication complexity of protocols that compute stable matchings. We work within the context of Gale and Shapley's original stable marriage problem\cite{GS62}: $n$ men and $n$ women each privately hold a…
In a stable matching problem there are two groups of agents, with agents on one side having their individual preferences for agents on another side as a potential match. It is assumed silently that agents can freely and costlessly ``switch"…
Machine learning (especially reinforcement learning) methods for trading are increasingly reliant on simulation for agent training and testing. Furthermore, simulation is important for validation of hand-coded trading strategies and for…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
Many smart grid frameworks, such as demand response programs, require accurate information about consumers' parameters (e.g., flexibility) at the aggregator side to optimize grid operations. Existing works typically rely on perfect…
Probabilistic forecasting in combination with stochastic programming is a key tool for handling the growing uncertainties in future energy systems. Derived from a general stochastic programming formulation for the optimal scheduling and…
This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family of optimal transport problems. The parameter reflects…
Properties of stable matchings in the popular random-matching-market model have been studied for over 50 years. In a random matching market, each agent has complete preferences drawn uniformly and independently at random. Wilson (1972),…