Related papers: Equilibrium, social welfare, and revenue in an inf…
We study social welfare relations (SWRs) on an infinite population. Our main result is a new characterization of a utilitarian SWR as the \emph{largest} SWR (in terms of subset when the weak relation is viewed as a set of pairs) which…
In various markets where sellers compete in price, price oscillations are observed rather than convergence to equilibrium. Such fluctuations have been empirically observed in the retail market for gasoline, in airline pricing and in the…
We study the power of item-pricing as a tool for approximately optimizing social welfare in a combinatorial market. We consider markets with $m$ indivisible items and $n$ buyers. The goal is to set prices to the items so that, when agents…
We consider the problem of customer equilibrium behavior of a single server Markovian queue with dynamic control of the service rate. Customers arrive according a Poisson procedure and the system administrator makes a service rate choice…
We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can…
This paper develops tools for welfare and revenue analyses of Bayes-Nash equilibria in asymmetric auctions with single-dimensional agents. We employ these tools to derive price of anarchy results for social welfare and revenue. Our approach…
In electricity markets, customers are increasingly constrained by their budgets. A budget constraint for a user is an upper bound on the price multiplied by the quantity. However, since prices are determined by the market equilibrium, the…
Problem definition: Transportation terminals such as airports often experience persistent oversupply of idle ride-sourcing drivers, resulting in long driver waiting times and inducing externalities such as curbside congestion. While…
We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…
We introduce the theoretical study of a Platform Equilibrium in a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can join a platform and transact with any buyer or remain off-platform and transact with a subset of…
We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in one-sided matching problems when agents have unrestricted cardinal preferences over a finite set of items. Random priority is a very well-known…
According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource -- such as bandwidth -- by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource…
We study a classical problem in revenue management: quantity-based single-resource revenue management with no-shows. In this problem, a firm observes a sequence of $T$ customers requesting a service. Each arrival is drawn independently from…
When network users are satisficing decision-makers, the resulting traffic pattern attains a satisficing user equilibrium, which may deviate from the (perfectly rational) user equilibrium. In a satisficing user equilibrium traffic pattern,…
This paper studies the equilibrium behavior of customers in the Geo/Geo/1 queueing system with multiple working vacations. The arriving customers decide whether to join or to balk the queueing systems based on the information of the queue…
This paper studies the efficiency of battery storage operations in electricity markets by comparing the social welfare gain achieved by a central planner to that of a decentralized profit-maximizing operator. The problem is formulated in a…
We consider a polling system with two queues, exhaustive service, no switch-over times and exponential service times. The waiting cost depends on the position of the queue relative to the server: It costs a customer c per time unit to wait…
We examine the complexity of computing welfare- and revenue-maximizing equilibria in autobidding second-price auctions subject to return-on-spend (RoS) constraints. We show that computing an autobidding equilibrium that approximates the…
In this paper, we address the existence and computation of competitive equilibrium in the transportation market for autonomous carpooling first proposed by [Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2019]. At equilibrium, the market organizes carpooled trips…
Many economic transactions, including those of online markets, have a time lag between the start and end times of transactions. Customers need to wait for completion of their transaction (order fulfillment) and hence are also interested in…