Maximal Social Welfare Relations on Infinite Populations Satisfying Permutation Invariance
Abstract
We study social welfare relations (SWRs) on an infinite population. Our main result is a new characterization of a utilitarian SWR as the \emph{largest} SWR (in terms of subset when the weak relation is viewed as a set of pairs) which satisfies Strong Pareto, Permutation Invariance (elsewhere called ``Relative Anonymity'' and ``Isomorphism Invariance''), and a further ``Quasi-Independence'' axiom.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2408.05851,
title = {Maximal Social Welfare Relations on Infinite Populations Satisfying Permutation Invariance},
author = {Jeremy Goodman and Harvey Lederman},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.05851},
year = {2024}
}
Comments
Theorem 1 generalized to a richer domain of worlds (finite-valued real functions), and strengthened by eliminating an earlier axiom, Additive Invariance. The result no longer uses lotteries, allowing for the combination of two earlier axioms (Dominance, Ex Ante Indifference) into a single one (Quasi-Independence). Various further small changes of terminology