Related papers: Mediated Cheap Talk Design (with proofs)
In this work, we study the experts problem in the distributed setting where an expert's cost needs to be aggregated across multiple servers. Our study considers various communication models such as the message-passing model and the…
We consider a trader who aims to liquidate a large position in the presence of an arbitrageur who hopes to profit from the trader's activity. The arbitrageur is uncertain about the trader's position and learns from observed price…
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which the designer can only commit to short-term mechanisms. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the outcomes of…
This paper analyzes the information disclosure problems originated in economics through the lens of information theory. Such problems are radically different from the conventional communication paradigms in information theory since they…
We study strategic information transmission in a hierarchical setting where information gets transmitted through a chain of agents up to a decision maker whose action is of importance to every agent. This situation could arise whenever an…
We study the principal-agent problem with a third party that we call social planner, whose responsibility is to reconcile the conflicts of interest between the two players and induce socially optimal outcome in terms of some given social…
We explore whether ambiguous communication can be beneficial to the sender in a persuasion problem, when the receiver (and possibly the sender) is ambiguity averse. Our analysis highlights the necessity of using a collection of experiments…
A designer relies on an experimenter to provide information to a decision maker, but the experimenter has incentives to persuade rather than merely transmit information. Anticipating this motive, the designer can restrict the set of…
We study a setting where a receiver must design a questionnaire to recover a sequence of symbols known to strategic sender, whose utility may not be incentive compatible. We allow the receiver the possibility of selecting the alternatives…
We apply control theoretic and optimization techniques to adaptively design incentives. In particular, we consider the problem of a planner with an objective that depends on data from strategic decision makers. The planner does not know the…
Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…
This report investigates the optimal design of event-triggered estimation for first-order linear stochastic systems. The problem is posed as a two-player team problem with a partially nested information pattern. The two players are given by…
This paper investigates how an autonomous agent can transmit information through its motion in an adversarial setting. We consider scenarios where an agent must reach its goal while deceiving an intelligent observer about its destination.…
A discourse planner for (task-oriented) dialogue must be able to make choices about whether relevant, but optional information (for example, the "satellites" in an RST-based planner) should be communicated. We claim that effective text…
I study a model of costly Bayesian persuasion by a privately and partially informed sender who conducts a public experiment. The cost of running an experiment is the expected reduction of a weighted log-likelihood ratio function of the…
There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information…
We are interested in studying how heterogeneous agents can learn to communicate and cooperate with each other without being explicitly pre-programmed to do so. Motivated by this goal, we present and analyze a distributed solution to a…
Peer-prediction is a mechanism which elicits privately-held, non-variable information from self-interested agents---formally, truth-telling is a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. The original Peer-prediction mechanism suffers…
This paper studies the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly attention effort. A sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific action. The experiment affects the receiver's…
A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the principal makes available, the agent may choose to ignore some.…