Related papers: Stabilization of Capacitated Matching Games
Capacitated network bargaining games are popular combinatorial games that involve the structure of matchings in graphs. We show that it is always possible to stabilize unit-weight instances of this problem (that is, ensure that they admit a…
An edge-weighted graph $G=(V,E)$ is called stable if the value of a maximum-weight matching equals the value of a maximum-weight fractional matching. Stable graphs play an important role in some interesting game theory problems, such as…
Stabilization of graphs has received substantial attention in recent years due to its connection to game theory. Stable graphs are exactly the graphs inducing a matching game with non-empty core. They are also the graphs that induce a…
We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by introducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph $G=(N,E)$, with an integer vertex capacity function $b$ and an edge weighting $w$. The set $N$ consists of a number of…
We study the stable matching problem in non-bipartite graphs with incomplete but strict preference lists, where the edges have weights and the goal is to compute a stable matching of minimum or maximum weight. This problem is known to be…
We study a network extension to the Nash bargaining game, as introduced by Kleinberg and Tardos (STOC'08), where the set of players corresponds to vertices in a graph $G=(V,E)$ and each edge $ij\in E$ represents a possible deal between…
In this paper, we study the relations between the numerical structure of the optimal solutions of a convex programming problem defined on the edge set of a simple graph and the stability number (i.e. the maximum size of a subset of pairwise…
A graph $G$ is \emph{equimatchable} if every maximal matching of $G$ has the same cardinality. We are interested in equimatchable graphs such that the removal of any edge from the graph preserves the equimatchability. We call an…
We study the graphs formed from instances of the stable matching problem by connecting pairs of elements with an edge when there exists a stable matching in which they are matched. Our results include the NP-completeness of recognizing…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
Given a graph G with n vertices and k players, each of which is placing a facility on one of the vertices of G, we define the score of the i'th player to be the number of vertices for which, among all players, the facility placed by the…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
The stability number of a graph G is the cardinality of a stability system of G (that is of a stable set of maximum size of G). A graph is alpha-stable if its stability number remains the same upon both the deletion and the addition of any…
An instance of a strongly stable matching problem (SSMP) is an undirected bipartite graph $G=(A \cup B, E)$, with an adjacency list of each vertex being a linearly ordered list of ties, which are subsets of vertices equally good for a given…
Motivated by the analogous questions in graphs, we study the complexity of coloring and stable set problems in hypergraphs with forbidden substructures and bounded edge size. Letting $\nu(G)$ denote the maximum size of a matching in $H$, we…
We present a method which provides a unified framework for most stability theorems that have been proved in graph and hypergraph theory. Our main result reduces stability for a large class of hypergraph problems to the simpler question of…
In the stable marriage and roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having a strictly ordered preference list over some or all of the other agents. A matching is a set of disjoint pairs of mutually accepted agents. If any…
A set $D\subseteq V$ of a graph $G=(V,E)$ is called a restrained dominating set of $G$ if every vertex not in $D$ is adjacent to a vertex in $D$ and to a vertex in $V \setminus D$. The \textsc{Minimum Restrained Domination} problem is to…
The maximal matching problem has received considerable attention in the self-stabilizing community. Previous work has given different self-stabilizing algorithms that solves the problem for both the adversarial and fair distributed daemon,…
Interdiction problems are leader-follower games in which the leader is allowed to delete a certain number of edges from the graph in order to maximally impede the follower, who is trying to solve an optimization problem on the impeded…