Related papers: A choiceless box game paradox
We present two collective games with new paradoxical features when they are combined. Besides reproducing the so--called Parrondo effect, where a winning game is obtained from the alternation of two fair games, a new effect appears, i.e.,…
We study variants of regular infinite games where the strict alternation of moves between the two players is subject to modifications. The second player may postpone a move for a finite number of steps, or, in other words, exploit in his…
In this work, we proposed a new $N$-person game in which the players can bet on two options, for example represented by two boxers. Some of the players have privileged information about the boxers and part of them can provide this…
After the social learning models were proposed, finding the solutions of the games becomes a well-defined mathematical question. However, almost all papers on the games and their applications are based on solutions built upon either an…
We introduce a betting game, where the gambler aims to guess the last success epoch from past observed data. The player may bet on the event that no further successes occur, or choose a `trap' which is any span of future times. In the…
Recently, the educational initiative TED-Ed has published a popular brain teaser coined the 'frog riddle', which illustrates non-intuitive implications of conditional probabilities. In its intended form, the frog riddle is a reformulation…
An analytical result and an algorithm are derived for the probability distribution of the one-dimensional cooperative Parrondo's games. We show that winning and the occurrence of the paradox depends on the number of players. Analytical…
Poker is ideal for testing automated reasoning under uncertainty. It introduces uncertainty both by physical randomization and by incomplete information about opponents hands.Another source OF uncertainty IS the limited information…
We consider a game in which two separate laboratories collaborate to prepare a quantum system and are then asked to guess the outcome of a measurement performed by a third party in a random basis on that system. Intuitively, by the…
In this paper, some new criteria for detecting whether a finite game is potential are proposed by solving potential equations. The verification equations with the minimal number for checking a potential game are obtained for the first time.…
We introduce a new method, involving infinite games and Borel determinacy, which we use to answer several well-known questions in Borel combinatorics.
This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…
In classical game theory, optimal strategies are determined for games with complete information; this requires knowledge of the opponent's goals. We analyze games when a player is mistaken about their opponents goals. For definitiveness, we…
In this paper, I will demonstrate a new perspective on the Two Envelope Problem. I hope to show with convincing clarity how the paradox results from an inherent problem pertaining to the interpretation of Bayesian probability. Specifically,…
The transitivity of preferences is one of the basic assumptions used in the theory of games and decisions. It is often equated with rationality of choice and is considered useful in building rankings. Intransitive preferences are considered…
Ripple Effect is a logic puzzle where the player has to fill numbers into empty cells in a rectangular grid. The grid is divided into rooms, and each room must contain consecutive integers starting from 1 to its size. Also, if two cells in…
In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions), which further induces hierarchies of…
This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…
We study an evolutionary game of chance in which the probabilities for different outcomes (e.g., heads or tails) depend on the amount wagered on those outcomes. The game is perhaps the simplest possible probabilistic game in which…
We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…