Related papers: A choiceless box game paradox

We consider multi-agent systems where agents actions and beliefs are determined aleatorically, or "by the throw of dice". This system consists of possible worlds that assign distributions to independent random variables, and agents who…

We consider extensive games with perfect information with well-founded game trees and study the problems of existence and of characterization of the sets of subgame perfect equilibria in these games. We also provide such characterizations…

We introduce a formal notion of masking fault-tolerance between probabilistic transition systems using stochastic games. These games are inspired in bisimulation games, but they also take into account the possible faulty behavior of…

Let us consider two companies A and B. Both of them are interested in buying a set of some goods. The company A is a big corporation and it knows the actual value of the good on the market and is able to observe the previous values of them.…

We prove that for a class of zero-sum differential games with incomplete information on both sides, the value admits a probabilistic representation as the value of a zero-sum stochastic differential game with complete information, where…

The recently discovered Parrondo's paradox claims that two losing games can result, under random or periodic alternation of their dynamics, in a winning game: "losing+losing=winning". In this paper we follow Parrondo's philosophy of…

The classical, complete-information two-player games assume that the problem data (in particular the payoff matrix) is known exactly by both players. In a now famous result, Nash has shown that any such game has an equilibrium in mixed…

Quantum guessing games form a versatile framework for studying different tasks of information processing. A quantum guessing game with posterior information uses quantum systems to encode messages and classical communication to give partial…

Two-player zero-sum repeated games are well understood. Computing the value of such a game is straightforward. Additionally, if the payoffs are dependent on a random state of the game known to one, both, or neither of the players, the…

Bayesian networks and their accompanying graphical models are widely used for prediction and analysis across many disciplines. We will reformulate these in terms of linear maps. This reformulation will suggest a natural extension, which we…

We consider the following card guessing game with no feedback. An ordered deck of n cards labeled 1 up to n is riffle-shuffled exactly one time. Then, the goal of the game is to maximize the number of correct guesses of the cards. One after…

Parrondo's paradox occurs in sequences of games in which a winning expectation may be obtained by playing the games in a random order, even though each game in the sequence may be lost when played individually. Several variations of…

Advice-efficient prediction with expert advice (in analogy to label-efficient prediction) is a variant of prediction with expert advice game, where on each round of the game we are allowed to ask for advice of a limited number $M$ out of…

We study a simple example of a sequential game illustrating problems connected with making rational decisions that are universal for social sciences. The set of chooser's optimal decisions that manifest his preferences in case of a constant…

We introduce a 2-player game played on an infinite grid, initially empty, where each player in turn chooses a vertex and colours it. The first player aims to create some pattern from a target set, while the second player aims to prevent it.…

I consider the natural infinitary variations of the games Wordle and Mastermind, as well as their game-theoretic variations Absurdle and Madstermind, considering these games with infinitely long words and infinite color sequences and…

This paper is a comment on quant-ph/0606067 by Ravon and Vaidman, in which they defend the position that the ``three-box paradox'' is indeed paradoxical.

So far, the theory of equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is insensitive to communication possibilities. To address this issue, we incorporate the assumption that communication reduces -- but does not…

We propose a general framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about other votes or about other voters' knowledge about her own vote. In this setting we define notions of manipulation and equilibrium. We also model…

An individual can only experience regret if she learns about an unchosen alternative. In many situations, learning about an unchosen alternative is possible only if someone else chose it. We develop a model where the ex-post information…