Related papers: Coordination through ambiguous language
This paper relaxes the common prior assumption in the public and private information game of Morris and Shin (2000, 2004). For the generalized game, where the agent's prior expectations are heterogenous, it derives a sharp condition for the…
This paper introduces a novel framework for modeling interacting humans in a multi-stage game. This "iterated semi network-form game" framework has the following desirable characteristics: (1) Bounded rational players, (2) strategic players…
We show a communication complexity lower bound for finding a correlated equilibrium of a two-player game. More precisely, we define a two-player $N \times N$ game called the 2-cycle game and show that the randomized communication complexity…
This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a…
We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most…
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…
This paper studies a nonzero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time under non-exponential discounting. For both players, there are two levels of game-theoretic reasoning intertwined. First, each player looks for an intra-personal equilibrium…
This paper investigates the Nash equilibrium seeking problems for networked games with intermittent communication, where each player is capable of communicating with other players intermittently over a strongly connected and directed graph.…
We construct several definitions of imbalance and playability, both of which are related to the existence of dominated strategies. Specifically, a maximally balanced game and a playable game cannot have dominated strategies for any player.…
In this paper, we study which data can be induced by a correlated equilibrium given a known finite simultaneous move game. We assume that an analyst has access to the frequency of each agent's actions but does not have access to the…
The human-agent team, which is a problem in which humans and autonomous agents collaborate to achieve one task, is typical in human-AI collaboration. For effective collaboration, humans want to have an effective plan, but in realistic…
In the context of simple finite-state discrete time systems, we introduce a generalization of mean field game solution, called correlated solution, which can be seen as the mean field game analogue of a correlated equilibrium. Our notion of…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
The usage of automated learning agents is becoming increasingly prevalent in many online economic applications such as online auctions and automated trading. Motivated by such applications, this paper is dedicated to fundamental modeling…
Mathematical models of interactions among rational agents have long been studied in game theory. However these interactions are often over a small set of discrete game actions which is very different from how humans communicate in natural…
This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…
LLMs are increasingly used in applications where they interact with humans and other agents. We propose to use behavioural game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behaviour. We let different LLMs play finitely repeated…
Causality plays an important role in daily processes, human reasoning, and artificial intelligence. There has however not been much research on causality in multi-agent strategic settings. In this work, we introduce a systematic way to…
We study which outcomes are implementable by disclosing coarse statistics of a data-generating process rather than its full distribution. Players observe data whose joint distribution is only partially known: they know the expectations of…
Traces form a coarse notion of semantic equivalence between states of a process, and have been studied coalgebraically for various types of system. We instantiate the finitary coalgebraic trace semantics framework of Hasuo et al. for…