Related papers: Coordination through ambiguous language
Video game designers often view confusion as undesirable, yet it is inevitable, as new players must adapt to new interfaces and mechanics in an increasingly varied and innovative game market, which is more popular than ever. Research…
We examine the tuning of cooperative behavior in repeated multi-agent games using an analytically tractable, continuous-time, nonlinear model of opinion dynamics. Each modeled agent updates its real-valued opinion about each available…
We introduce language-based games, a generalization of psychological games [6] that can also capture reference-dependent preferences [7]. The idea is to extend the domain of the utility function to situations, maximal consistent sets in…
We propose a fresh `meta-game' perspective on the problem of algorithmic collusion in pricing games a la Bertrand. Economists have interpreted the fact that algorithms can learn to price collusively as tacit collusion. We argue instead that…
We study natural strategic games on directed graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. We show that these games do not need to have a pure Nash equilibrium and that the problem of…
We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study structured perfect Bayesian equilibria…
We study the interpersonal trust of a population of agents, asking whether chance may decide if a population ends up in a high trust or low trust state. We model this by a discrete time, random matching stochastic coordination game. Agents…
We obtain global, non-asymptotic convergence guarantees for independent learning algorithms in competitive reinforcement learning settings with two agents (i.e., zero-sum stochastic games). We consider an episodic setting where in each…
This paper presents new families of algorithms for the repeated play of two-agent (near) zero-sum games and two-agent zero-sum stochastic games. For example, the family includes fictitious play and its variants as members. Commonly, the…
We study lower bounds on the query complexity of determining correlated equilibrium. In particular, we consider a query model in which an n-player game is specified via a black box that returns players' utilities at pure action profiles. In…
We present a general framework for evolutionary learning to emergent unbiased state representation without any supervision. Evolutionary frameworks such as self-play converge to bad local optima in case of multi-agent reinforcement learning…
Kuhn's Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrate the limits…
In this paper, we consider coordination and anti-coordination heterogeneous games played by a finite population formed by different types of individuals who fail to recognize their own type but do observe the type of their opponent. We show…
Decision-making individuals often imitate their highest-earning fellows rather than optimize their own utilities, due to bounded rationality and incomplete information. Perpetual fluctuations between decisions have been reported as the…
We provide a compositional coalgebraic semantics for strategic games. In our framework, like in the semantics of functional programming languages, coalgebras represent the observable behaviour of systems derived from the behaviour of the…
Applications of machine learning inform human decision makers in a broad range of tasks. The resulting problem is usually formulated in terms of a single decision maker. We argue that it should rather be described as a two-player learning…
Recent work (Xu et al., 2020) has suggested that numeral systems in different languages are shaped by a functional need for efficient communication in an information-theoretic sense. Here we take a learning-theoretic approach and show how…
Language is a powerful communicative and cognitive tool. It enables humans to express thoughts, share intentions, and reason about complex phenomena. Despite our fluency in using and understanding language, the question of how it arises and…
Learning in games refers to scenarios where multiple players interact in a shared environment, each aiming to minimize their regret. An equilibrium can be computed at a fast rate of $O(1/T)$ when all players follow the optimistic…
To regulate a social system comprised of self-interested agents, economic incentives are often required to induce a desirable outcome. This incentive design problem naturally possesses a bilevel structure, in which a designer modifies the…