Related papers: Why do experts give simple advice?

Decision-makers are often experts of their domain and take actions based on their domain knowledge. Doctors, for instance, may prescribe treatments by predicting the likely outcome of each available treatment. Actions of an expert thus…

We investigate the behavior of experts who seek to make predictions with maximum impact on an audience. At a known future time, a certain continuous random variable will be realized. A public prediction gradually converges to the outcome,…

We study expert advice under reputational incentives, with sell-side equity research as the lead application. A long-lived analyst receives a continuous private signal about a binary payoff and recommends a risky (Buy) or safe action.…

An expert seller chooses an experiment to influence a client's purchasing decision, but may manipulate the experiment result for personal gain. When credibility surpasses a critical threshold, the expert chooses a fully-revealing experiment…

In various situations, decision makers face experts that may provide conflicting advice. This advice may be in the form of probabilistic forecasts over critical future events. We consider a setting where the two forecasters provide their…

Action advising is a knowledge transfer technique for reinforcement learning based on the teacher-student paradigm. An expert teacher provides advice to a student during training in order to improve the student's sample efficiency and…

Testing the validity of claims made by self-proclaimed experts can be impossible when testing them in isolation, even with infinite observations at the disposal of the tester. However, in a multiple expert setting it is possible to design a…

Advice-efficient prediction with expert advice (in analogy to label-efficient prediction) is a variant of prediction with expert advice game, where on each round of the game we are allowed to ask for advice of a limited number $M$ out of…

We study a cheap-talk game where two experts first choose what information to acquire and then offer advice to a decision-maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. The experts cannot commit to reporting strategies. Yet, we show that…

The survey is concerned with the issue of information transmission from experts to non-experts. Two main approaches to the use of experts can be traced. According to the game-theoretic approach expertise is a case of asymmetric information…

We consider a setting where in a known future time, a certain continuous random variable will be realized. There is a public prediction that gradually converges to its realized value, and an expert that has access to a more accurate…

Conventional learning with expert advice methods assumes a learner is always receiving the outcome (e.g., class labels) of every incoming training instance at the end of each trial. In real applications, acquiring the outcome from oracle…

Experts' beliefs embody a present state of knowledge. It is desirable to take this knowledge into account when doing analyses or making decisions. Yet ranking experts based on the merit of their beliefs is a difficult task. In this paper we…

We study expert advice with career concerns and continuous private signals. The principal always implements the safe option, and implements the risky option with a probability increasing in the expert's reputation; outcomes, when realized,…

Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired while replies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations often force…

We analyze situations in which players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing particular actions. A patient player facing a sequence of short-run opponents makes an announcement about their intended action after observing an…

An informed Advisor and an uninformed Decision-Maker, with conflicting interests, engage in repeated cheap talk communication in always new decision problems. While the Decision-Maker's optimal payoff is attainable in some subgame-perfect…

We study the notion of informedness in a client-consultant setting. Using a software simulator, we examine the extent to which it pays off for consultants to provide their clients with advice that is well-informed, or with advice that is…

We construct a model of expert prediction where predictions can influence the state of the world. Under this model, we show through theoretical and numerical results that proper scoring rules can incentivize experts to manipulate the world…

We consider settings where an uninformed principal must hear arguments from two better-informed agents, corresponding to two possible courses of action that they argue for. The arguments are verifiable in the sense that the true state of…