Related papers: Why do experts give simple advice?
We study multidimensional cheap talk with simple language and aligned preferences. An expert communicates with a decision-maker using a score that aggregates a multidimensional state into a one-dimensional message. Even though the expert…
We investigate the problem of a principal looking to contract an expert to provide a probability forecast for a categorical event. We assume all experts have a common public prior on the event's probability, but can form more accurate…
Why do some investors delegate financial decisions to supposed experts? We report a laboratory experiment designed to disentangle four possible motives. Almost 600 investors drawn from the Prolific subject pool choose whether or not to…
When a human receives a prediction or recommended course of action from an intelligent agent, what additional information, beyond the prediction or recommendation itself, does the human require from the agent to decide whether to trust or…
Statisticians and data scientists find insights that help lead to better understanding and better outcomes. When clients and managers come to us for help (and even when they don't), we want to share our advice. While we should be free to…
Common sense suggests that when individuals explain why they believe something, we can arrive at more accurate conclusions than when they simply state what they believe. Yet, there is no known mechanism that provides incentives to elicit…
When people receive advice while making difficult decisions, they often make better decisions in the moment and also increase their knowledge in the process. However, such incidental learning can only occur when people cognitively engage…
In this paper we introduce a simple modal logic framework to reason about the expertise of an information source. In the framework, a source is an expert on a proposition $p$ if they are able to correctly determine the truth value of $p$ in…
Previous research on expert advice-taking shows that humans exhibit two contradictory behaviors: on the one hand, people tend to overvalue their own opinions undervaluing the expert opinion, and on the other, people often defer to other…
A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state. Even though neither how the agent learns nor what the agent discovers are contractible, we show the principal is unconstrained as to what information the agent…
We study a communication game between a sender and a receiver. The sender chooses one of her signals about the state of the world (i.e., anecdotes) and communicates to the receiver who takes an action affecting both players. The sender and…
Modern recommendation systems rely on the wisdom of the crowd to learn the optimal course of action. This induces an inherent mis-alignment of incentives between the system's objective to learn (explore) and the individual users' objective…
It is the role of the scientific community to provide for the knowledge of scientific facts and technical capabilities as a background for political decision-making. The reasons are given why governments are sometimes not ready to accept…
An agent chooses an action based on her private information and a recommendation from an informed but potentially misaligned adviser. With a known probability, the adviser truthfully reports his signal; with the remaining probability, he…
I study whether and which expert incentives can be provided at what cost when the states of the world become non-contractible, but there is some noisy observation about the states that can be contracted upon. A principal hires an agent to…
A sender with state-independent preferences (i.e., transparent motives) privately observes a signal about the state of the world before sending a message to a receiver, who subsequently takes an action. Regardless of whether the receiver…
We develop a qualitative model of decision making with two aims: to describe how people make simple decisions and to enable computer programs to do the same. Current approaches based on Planning or Decisions Theory either ignore uncertainty…
Consider a policymaker who wants to decide which intervention to perform in order to change a currently undesirable situation. The policymaker has at her disposal a team of experts, each with their own understanding of the causal…
We consider mechanisms for truthfully eliciting probabilistic predictions from a group of experts. The standard approach -- using a proper scoring rule to separately reward each expert -- is not robust to collusion: experts may collude to…
Decisions in organizations are about evaluating alternatives and choosing the one that would best serve organizational goals. To the extent that the evaluation of alternatives could be formulated as a predictive task with appropriate…