Reputational Conservatism in Expert Advice
Theoretical Economics
2025-11-13 v5
Abstract
We study expert advice with career concerns and continuous private signals. The principal always implements the safe option, and implements the risky option with a probability increasing in the expert's reputation; outcomes, when realized, update reputation. We show a unique cutoff equilibrium and continuity. Under a relative-diagnosticity condition, the experimentation threshold is increasing in reputation ("playing it safe at the top"). Comparative statics are clean, and success-contingent bonuses map one-to-one into experimentation while gatekeeping scales implemented experimentation and learning.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2509.04036,
title = {Reputational Conservatism in Expert Advice},
author = {Georgy Lukyanov and Anna Vlasova},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2509.04036},
year = {2025}
}