Related papers: Noise Stability of Ranked Choice Voting
In distortion-based analysis of social choice rules over metric spaces, one assumes that all voters and candidates are jointly embedded in a common metric space. Voters rank candidates by non-decreasing distance. The mechanism, receiving…
Rankings are central to decision-making in fields ranging from education to online platforms, yet classical deterministic methods such as the Borda count method or Copeland-type pairwise methods ignore uncertainty due to sampling noise or…
Designing private voting rules is an important and pressing problem for trustworthy democracy. In this paper, under the framework of differential privacy, we propose a novel famliy of randomized voting rules based on the well-known…
To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings,…
We study the problem of coalitional manipulation---where $k$ manipulators try to manipulate an election on $m$ candidates---under general scoring rules, with a focus on the Borda protocol. We do so both in the weighted and unweighted…
Lasso and other regularization procedures are attractive methods for variable selection, subject to a proper choice of shrinkage parameter. Given a set of potential subsets produced by a regularization algorithm, a consistent model…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of a group of voters over some set of $m$ alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. A seminal characterization of strategyproof SDSs by Gibbard implies that there…
In this paper, we study fairness in committee selection problems. We consider a general notion of fairness via stability: A committee is stable if no coalition of voters can deviate and choose a committee of proportional size, so that all…
Elections where electors rank the candidates (or a subset of the candidates) in order of preference allow the collection of more information about the electors' intent. The most widely used election of this type is Instant-Runoff Voting…
Ranked choice voting is vulnerable to monotonicity failure - a voting failure where a candidate is cost an election due to losing voter preference or granted an election due to gaining voter preference. Despite increasing use of ranked…
This paper proposes normative criteria for voting rules under uncertainty about individual preferences. The criteria emphasize the importance of responsiveness, i.e., the probability that the social outcome coincides with the realized…
The main idea of the {\em distance rationalizability} approach to view the voters' preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus is deeply rooted in social choice literature. It allows one to define ("rationalize")…
In ranked-choice elections voters cast preference ballots which provide a voter's ranking of the candidates. The method of ranked-choice voting (RCV) chooses a winner by using voter preferences to simulate a series of runoff elections. Some…
We study approval-based committee voting from a novel perspective. While extant work largely centers around proportional representation of the voters, we shift our focus to the candidates while preserving proportionality. Intuitively,…
A Condorcet winning set addresses the Condorcet paradox by selecting a few candidates--rather than a single winner--such that no unselected alternative is preferred to all of them by a majority of voters. This idea extends to…
Contamination can severely distort an estimator unless the estimation procedure is suitably robust. This is a well-known issue and has been addressed in Robust Statistics, however, the relation of contamination and distorted variable…
The paper has established and verified the theory prevailing widely among image and pattern recognition specialists that the bottom-up indirect regional matching process is the more stable and the more robust than the global matching…
Gaussian noise stability results have recently played an important role in proving results in hardness of approximation in computer science and in the study of voting schemes in social choice. We prove a new Gaussian noise stability result…
We analyze how frequently instant runoff voting (IRV) selects the weakest (or least popular) candidate in three-candidate elections. We consider four definitions of ``weakest candidate'': the Borda loser, the Bucklin loser, the candidate…
The Majority is Stablest Theorem has numerous applications in hardness of approximation and social choice theory. We give a new proof of the Majority is Stablest Theorem by induction on the dimension of the discrete cube. Unlike the…