Risk-Limiting Audits for Condorcet Elections
Abstract
Elections where electors rank the candidates (or a subset of the candidates) in order of preference allow the collection of more information about the electors' intent. The most widely used election of this type is Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV), where candidates are eliminated one by one, until a single candidate holds the majority of the remaining ballots. Condorcet elections treat the election as a set of simultaneous decisions about each pair of candidates. The Condorcet winner is the candidate who beats all others in these pairwise contests. There are various proposals to determine a winner if no Condorcet winner exists. In this paper we show how we can efficiently audit Condorcet elections for a number of variations. We also compare the audit efficiency (how many ballots we expect to sample) of IRV and Condorcet elections.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2303.10509,
title = {Risk-Limiting Audits for Condorcet Elections},
author = {Michelle Blom and Peter J. Stuckey and Vanessa Teague and Damjan Vukcevic},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.10509},
year = {2023}
}
Comments
15 pages, accepted for Voting'23. This version fixes some errors in one of the examples