Related papers: Envy-freeness in 3D Hedonic Games
We initiate the study of control in hedonic games, where an external actor influences coalition formation by adding or deleting agents. We consider three basic control goals (1) enforcing that an agent is not alone (NA); (2) enforcing that…
We study hedonic coalition formation games in which cooperation among the players is restricted by a graph structure: a subset of players can form a coalition if and only if they are connected in the given graph. We investigate the…
We consider a team formation setting where agents have varying levels of expertise in a global set of required skills, and teams are ranked with respect to how well the expertise of teammates complement each other. We model this setting as…
Hedonic games provide a natural model of coalition formation among self-interested agents. The associated problem of finding stable outcomes in such games has been extensively studied. In this paper, we identify simple conditions on…
We consider the complexity of maximizing egalitarian welfare in Friends and Enemies Games -- a subclass of hedonic games in which every agent partitions other agents into friends and enemies. We investigate two classic scenarios proposed in…
In multiplayer games with sequential decision-making, self-interested players form dynamic coalitions to achieve most-preferred temporal goals beyond their individual capabilities. We introduce a novel procedure to synthesize strategies…
We study the envy-free house allocation problem when agents have uncertain preferences over items and consider several well-studied preference uncertainty models. The central problem that we focus on is computing an allocation that has the…
Hedonic games are fundamental models for investigating the formation of coalitions among a set of strategic agents, where every agent has a certain utility for every possible coalition of agents it can be part of. To avoid the…
In this paper we study envy-free division problems. The classical approach to such problems, used by David Gale, reduces to considering continuous maps of a simplex to itself and finding sufficient conditions for this map to hit the center…
Coalition formation studies how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions under consideration of their preferences. We study the classical objective of stability in a variant of additively separable hedonic games where agents…
We consider an assignment problem that has aspects of fair division as well as social choice. In particular, we investigate the problem of assigning a small subset from a set of indivisible items to multiple players so that the chosen…
Incentive mechanism design is crucial for enabling federated learning. We deal with clustering problem of agents contributing to federated learning setting. Assuming agents behave selfishly, we model their interaction as a stable coalition…
We initiate the study of multi-layered cake cutting with the goal of fairly allocating multiple divisible resources (layers of a cake) among a set of agents. The key requirement is that each agent can only utilize a single resource at each…
Human societies are characterized, besides others, by three constituent features. (A) Options, as for jobs and societal positions, differ with respect to their associated monetary and non-monetary payoffs. (B) Competition leads to reduced…
A vast array of envy-free results have been found for the subdivision of one-dimensional resources, such as the interval $[0,1]$. The goal is to divide the space into $n$ pieces and distribute them among $n$ observers such that each…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents whose preferences include externalities. Unlike the standard fair division model, agents may derive positive or negative utility not only from items allocated…
We study the classic problem of dividing a collection of indivisible resources in a fair and efficient manner among a set of agents having varied preferences. Pareto optimality is a standard notion of economic efficiency, which states that…
Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible goods that addresses pairwise envy by the removal of at most one good. In the worst case, each pair of agents might require the (hypothetical) removal of a…
I provide a unified framework to establish the existence of a weak Pareto efficient, envy-free allocation in general settings: random allocations are probability measures on a compact metric space, and preferences of agents are represented…
Partitioning a set of $n$ items or agents while maximizing the value of the partition is a fundamental algorithmic task. We study this problem in the specific setting of maximizing social welfare in additively separable hedonic games.…