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In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and…

Many well-studied learning dynamics, such as fictitious play and the replicator, are known to not converge in general $N$-player games. The simplest mode of non-convergence is cyclical or periodic behavior. Such cycles are fundamental…

Optimization of deep learning algorithms to approach Nash Equilibrium remains a significant problem in imperfect information games, e.g. StarCraft and poker. Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP) has provided an effective way to learn…

Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…

The goal of agents in multi-agent environments is to maximize total reward against the opposing agents that are encountered. Following a game-theoretic solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium, may obtain a strong performance in some…

Cut games are among the most fundamental strategic games in algorithmic game theory. It is well-known that computing an exact pure Nash equilibrium in these games is PLS-hard, so research has focused on computing approximate equilibria. We…

We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by…

We introduce two Smoothed Policy Iteration algorithms (\textbf{SPI}s) as rules for learning policies and methods for computing Nash equilibria in second order potential Mean Field Games (MFGs). Global convergence is proved if the coupling…

We consider various probabilistic games with piles for one player or two players. In each round of the game, a player randomly chooses to add $a$ or $b$ chips to his pile under the condition that $a$ and $b$ are not necessarily positive. If…

In this article we evaluate the statistical evidence that a population of students learn about the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the centipede game via repeated play of the game. This is done by formulating a model in which a…

Researchers on artificial intelligence have achieved human-level intelligence in large-scale perfect-information games, but it is still a challenge to achieve (nearly) optimal results (in other words, an approximate Nash Equilibrium) in…

Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept for solving imperfect-information games in practice. However, it has a major drawback: it does not preclude suboptimal play in branches of the game tree that are not reached in equilibrium.…

Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social science. It is common practice to assume that players quickly converge to an equilibrium, e.g. a Nash equilibrium. This can be studied in…

Graph games of infinite length are a natural model for open reactive processes: one player represents the controller, trying to ensure a given specification, and the other represents a hostile environment. The evolution of the system…

We investigate the complexity of computing approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games. Our main algorithmic result is the following: For any $n$-player anonymous game with a bounded number of strategies and any constant $\delta>0$, an…

The Ultimatum Game is conventionally formulated in the context of two players. Nonetheless, real-life scenarios often entail community interactions among numerous individuals. To address this, we introduce an extended version of the…

This paper combines ideas from Q-learning and fictitious play to define three reinforcement learning procedures which converge to the set of stationary mixed Nash equilibria in identical interest discounted stochastic games. First, we…

Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover Nash equilibria of various classes of finite games. Special classes of continuous games with infinite strategy spaces, such as polynomial games, can be solved by semidefinite…

We consider a dynamical approach to game in extensive forms. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding…

In this paper, we study the problem of learning the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria and the exact structure of a continuous-action graphical game with quadratic payoffs by observing a small set of perturbed equilibria. A…