Related papers: On Almost-Sure Intention Deception Planning that E…

Covert planning refers to a class of constrained planning problems where an agent aims to accomplish a task with minimal information leaked to a passive observer to avoid detection. However, existing methods of covert planning often…

We study decision-making with rational inattention in settings where agents have perception constraints. In such settings, inaccurate prior beliefs or models of others may lead to inattention blindness, where an agent is unaware of its…

Qualitative opacity of a secret is a security property, which means that a system trajectory satisfying the secret is observation-equivalent to a trajectory violating the secret. In this paper, we study how to synthesize a control policy…

Today's high-stakes adversarial interactions feature attackers who constantly breach the ever-improving security measures. Deception mitigates the defender's loss by misleading the attacker to make suboptimal decisions. In order to formally…

Progressively intricate cyber infiltration mechanisms have made conventional means of defense, such as firewalls and malware detectors, incompetent. These sophisticated infiltration mechanisms can study the defender's behavior, identify…

This paper is concerned with the optimal allocation of detection resources (sensors) to mitigate multi-stage attacks, in the presence of the defender's uncertainty in the attacker's intention. We model the attack planning problem using a…

In this paper, we consider an adversarial scenario where one agent seeks to achieve an objective and its adversary seeks to learn the agent's intentions and prevent the agent from achieving its objective. The agent has an incentive to try…

Deception is virtually ubiquitous in warfare, and should be a central consideration for military operations research. However, studies of agent behaviour in simulated operations have typically neglected to include explicit models of…

We study the optimal design of stealthy attacks against partially observed linear control systems. We first propose a novel likelihood-based detection mechanism derived from the innovation process, based on which we quantify stealthiness…

Defensive deception is a promising approach for cyber defense. Via defensive deception, the defender can anticipate attacker actions; it can mislead or lure attacker, or hide real resources. Although defensive deception is increasingly…

We study a class of two-player competitive concurrent stochastic games on graphs with reachability objectives. Specifically, player 1 aims to reach a subset $F_1$ of game states, and player 2 aims to reach a subset $F_2$ of game states…

This paper presents an intelligent and adaptive agent that employs deception to recognize a cyber adversary's intent. Unlike previous approaches to cyber deception, which mainly focus on delaying or confusing the attackers, we focus on…

This paper investigates backdoor attack planning in stochastic control systems modeled as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). A backdoor attack involves an adversary deploying a policy that performs well in the original MDP to pass testing,…

We consider the probabilistic planning problem where the agent (called Player 1, or P1) can jointly plan the control actions and sensor queries in a sensor network and an attacker (called player 2, or P2) can carry out attacks on the…

We study the design of autonomous agents that are capable of deceiving outside observers about their intentions while carrying out tasks in stochastic, complex environments. By modeling the agent's behavior as a Markov decision process, we…

We consider the probabilistic planning problem for a defender (P1) who can jointly query the sensors and take control actions to reach a set of goal states while being aware of possible sensor attacks by an adversary (P2) who has perfect…

In this paper, we propose a planning framework to generate a defense strategy against an attacker who is working in an environment where a defender can operate without the attacker's knowledge. The objective of the defender is to covertly…

Deception is a common defense mechanism against adversaries with an information disadvantage. It can force such adversaries to select suboptimal policies for a defender's benefit. We consider a setting where an adversary tries to learn the…

Deception is a crucial tool in the cyberdefence repertoire, enabling defenders to leverage their informational advantage to reduce the likelihood of successful attacks. One way deception can be employed is through obscuring, or masking,…

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent systems, understanding adversarial manipulation becomes critical for defensive design. We present a systematic study of intentional deception as an engineered capability, using…