Related papers: Generic catastrophic poverty when selfish investor…
We study the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism, that is widely used to allocate divisible resources. Each agent submits a bid for each divisible resource and receives a fraction proportional to her bids. We quantify the…
The public goods game is a famous example illustrating the tragedy of the commons. In this game cooperating individuals contribute to a pool, which in turn is distributed to all members of the group, including defectors who reap the same…
We study the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of agents' utilities, in two well-known models. The first model involves one-sided preferences, where a set of indivisible items is allocated among a group…
Because human preferences are too complex to codify, AIs operate with misspecified objectives. Optimizing such objectives often produces undesirable outcomes; this phenomenon is known as reward hacking. Such outcomes are not necessarily…
We introduce a new class of games called the networked common goods game (NCGG), which generalizes the well-known common goods game. We focus on a fairly general subclass of the game where each agent's utility functions are the same across…
Social dilemmas are situations in which collective welfare is at odds with individual gain. One widely studied example, due to the conflict it poses between human behaviour and game theoretic reasoning, is the Traveler's Dilemma. The…
We consider existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria in an $N$-player game of utility maximization under relative performance criteria of multiplicative form in complete semimartingale markets. For a large class of players' utility…
This paper examines public goods and evaluates the mechanism through the game theory. Public goods are characterized by nonexclusivity and nonrivalry and this creates fundamental challenges for allocation. We analyze why competitive markets…
The all-pay auction, a classic competitive model, is widely applied in scenarios such as political elections, sports competitions, and research and development, where all participants pay their bids regardless of winning or losing. However,…
We present and analyze a model for the evolution of the wealth distribution within a heterogeneous economic environment. The model considers a system of rational agents interacting in a game theoretical framework, through fairly general…
Traders in a market typically have widely different, private information on the return of an asset. The equilibrium price of the asset may reflect this information more accurately if the number of traders is large enough compared to the…
We study a networked economic system composed of $n$ producers supplying a single homogeneous good to a number of geographically separated markets and of a centralized authority, called the market maker. Producers compete \`a la Cournot, by…
Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of…
Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved within the set of correlated equilibria for general objectives.…
A collective choice problem is a finite set of social alternatives and a finite set of economic agents with vNM utility functions. We associate a public goods economy with each collective choice problem and establish the existence and…
A selfish learner seeks to maximize their own success, disregarding others. When success is measured as payoff in a game played against another learner, mutual selfishness typically fails to produce the optimal outcome for a pair of…
Cooperation among self-interested players in a social dilemma is fragile and easily interrupted by mistakes. In this work, we study the repeated $n$-person public-goods game and search for a strategy that forms a cooperative Nash…
Optimization methods are used to determine equilibria of investment in cryptocurrencies. The basic assumptions involve existence of a core group (the "wealthy") that fears the loss of substantial assets through government seizure.…
Cooperation between individuals is emergent in all parts of society, yet mechanistic reasons for this emergence is ill understood in the literature. A specific example of this is insurance. Recent work has, though, shown that assuming the…
We establish a Nash equilibrium in a market with $ N $ agents with the performance criteria of relative wealth level when the market return is unobservable. Each investor has a random prior belief on the return rate of the risky asset. The…