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Experimental economics has repeatedly demonstrated that the Nash equilibrium makes inaccurate predictions for a vast set of games. Instead, several alternative theoretical concepts predict behavior that is much more in tune with observed…
We consider non-cooperative unsplittable congestion games where players share resources, and each player's strategy is pure and consists of a subset of the resources on which it applies a fixed weight. Such games represent unsplittable…
Economists were content with the concept of the Nash equilibrium as game theory's solution concept until Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou showed that finding a Nash equilibrium is most likely a computationally hard problem, a result…
We consider a market impact game for $n$ risk-averse agents that are competing in a market model with linear transient price impact and additional transaction costs. For both finite and infinite time horizons, the agents aim to minimize a…
We consider the terminal wealth utility maximization problem from the point of view of a portfolio manager who is paid by an incentive scheme, which is given as a convex function $g$ of the terminal wealth. The manager's own utility…
This paper introduces a novel class of multi-stage resource allocation games that model real-world scenarios in which profitability depends on the balance between supply and demand, and where higher resource investment leads to greater…
We study a complementarity game with multiple populations whose members' offered contributions are put together towards some common aim. When the sum of the players' offers reaches or exceeds some threshold K, they each receive K minus…
For centuries, national economies created wealth by engaging in international trade and production. The resulting international supply networks not only increase wealth for countries, but also create systemic risk: economic shocks,…
We consider a selfish variant of the knapsack problem. In our version, the items are owned by agents, and each agent can misrepresent the set of items she owns---either by avoiding reporting some of them (understating), or by reporting…
We develop polynomial-time algorithms for the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods among $n$ agents that have subadditive valuations over the goods. We first consider the Nash social welfare as our objective and design a…
In this paper, we examine in an abstract framework, how a tradeoff between efficiency and robustness arises in different dynamic oligopolistic market architectures. We consider a market in which there is a monopolistic resource provider and…
This paper studies a stochastic utility maximization game under relative performance concerns in finite agent and infinite agent settings, where a continuum of agents interact through a graphon (see definition below). We consider an…
In recent years, data has played an increasingly important role in the economy as a good in its own right. In many settings, data aggregators cannot directly verify the quality of the data they purchase, nor the effort exerted by data…
We consider a single buyer with a combinatorial preference that would like to purchase related products and services from different vendors, where each vendor supplies exactly one product. We study the general case where subsets of products…
One key in real-life Nash equilibrium applications is to calibrate players' cost functions. To leverage the approximation ability of neural networks, we proposed a general framework for optimizing and learning Nash equilibrium using neural…
Shared-constraint games are noncooperative $N$-player games where players are coupled through a common coupling constraint. It is known that such games admit two kinds of equilibria -- generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) and variational…
We introduce a class of resource games where resources and preferences are specified with the language of a resource-sensitive logic. The agents are endowed with a bag of resources and try to achieve a resource objective. For each agent, an…
Recently Cole and Gkatzelis gave the first constant factor approximation algorithm for the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents, under additive valuations, so as to maximize the Nash Social Welfare. We give constant factor…
I study coordination failures in housing development markets with network effects, where the value of building depends on aggregate supply. When network effects are sufficiently strong and convex, multiple equilibria arise: a low-supply…
Having fixed capacities, homogeneous products and price sensitive customer purchase decision are primary distinguishing characteristics of numerous revenue management systems. Even with two or three rivals, competition is still highly…