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Cryptocurrency Equilibria Through Game Theoretic Optimization

Mathematical Finance 2019-04-16 v2 General Finance

Abstract

Optimization methods are used to determine equilibria of investment in cryptocurrencies. The basic assumptions involve existence of a core group (the "wealthy") that fears the loss of substantial assets through government seizure. Speculators constitute another group that tends to introduce volatility and risk for the wealthy. The wealthy must divide their assets between the home currency and the cryptocurrency, while the government decides on the probability of seizing a fraction the assets of this group. Under the assumption that each group exhibits risk aversion through a utility function, we establish the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. Also examined is the more realistic optimization problem in which the government policy cannot be reversed, while the wealthy can adjust their allocation in reaction to the government's designation of probability. The methodology leads to an understanding the equilibrium market capitalization of cryptocurrencies.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1805.10128,
  title  = {Cryptocurrency Equilibria Through Game Theoretic Optimization},
  author = {Carey Caginalp and Gunduz Caginalp},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.10128},
  year   = {2019}
}

Comments

5 pages, 2 figures

R2 v1 2026-06-23T02:08:20.873Z