Related papers: Cryptocurrency Equilibria Through Game Theoretic O…
We consider the problem of a game theorist analyzing a game that uses cryptographic protocols. Ideally, a theorist abstracts protocols as ideal, implementation-independent primitives, letting conclusions in the "ideal world" carry over to…
Optimal simple rules for the monetary policy of the first stochastically dominant crypto-currency are derived in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, in order to provide optimal responses to changes in inflation, output,…
The goal of cryptocurrencies is decentralization. In principle, all currencies have equal status. Unlike traditional stock markets, there is no default currency of denomination (fiat), thus the trading pairs can be set freely. However, it…
Blockchain governance is a subject of ongoing research and an interdisciplinary view of blockchain governance is vital to aid in further research for establishing a formal governance framework for this nascent technology. In this paper, the…
This paper introduces a structural game-theoretic model to value decentralized digital assets like Bitcoin. Instead of relying on speculative beliefs, it frames the asset's price within a Rational-Expectations Security-Utility Nash…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
This study investigates three central questions in portfolio optimization. First, whether time-varying moment estimators outperform conventional sample estimators in practical portfolio construction. Second, whether incorporating a turnover…
We study a game-theoretic model of blockchain mining economies and show that griefing, a practice according to which participants harm other participants at some lesser cost to themselves, is a prevalent threat at its Nash equilibria. The…
We initiate the study of quantum races, games where two or more quantum computers compete to solve a computational problem. While the problem of dueling algorithms has been studied for classical deterministic algorithms, the quantum case…
We propose a modelling framework for the optimal selection of crypto assets. Crypto assets differ by two essential features: security (technological) and stability (governance). Investors make choices over crypto assets similarly to how…
We demonstrate market inefficiency in cryptoasset markets. Our approach examines investments that share a dominant risk factor but differ in their exposure to a secondary risk. We derive equilibrium restrictions that must hold regardless of…
The problem of investing into a cryptocurrency market requires good understanding of the processes that regulate the price of the currency. In this paper we offer a view of a cryptocurrency market as an environment for realization of a…
We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…
Despite being described as a medium of exchange, cryptocurrencies do not have the typical attributes of a medium of exchange. Consequently, cryptocurrencies are more appropriately described as crypto assets. A common investment attribute…
We consider a market impact game for $n$ risk-averse agents that are competing in a market model with linear transient price impact and additional transaction costs. For both finite and infinite time horizons, the agents aim to minimize a…
Choosing a hard-to-guess secret is a prerequisite in many security applications. Whether it is a password for user authentication or a secret key for a cryptographic primitive, picking it requires the user to trade-off usability costs with…
Centralized monetary policy, leading to persistent inflation, is often inconsistent, untrustworthy, and unpredictable. Algorithmic stablecoins enabled by blockchain technology are promising in solving this problem. Algorithmic stablecoins…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
Nash equilibrium is a solution concept in non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game theory that finds applications in various scientific and engineering disciplines. A non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game model is presented…