Related papers: Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Appr…

We study a game of strategic information design between a sender, who chooses state-dependent information structures, a mediator who can then garble the signals generated from these structures, and a receiver who takes an action after…

We introduce the concept of leakage-robust Bayesian persuasion. Situated between public persuasion [KG11, CCG23, Xu20] and private persuasion [AB19], leakage-robust persuasion considers a setting where one or more signals privately sent by…

We investigate how the choice of decision makers can be varied under the presence of risk and uncertainty. Our analysis is based on the approach we have previously applied to individual decision makers, which we now generalize to the case…

Robust and distributionally robust optimization are modeling paradigms for decision-making under uncertainty where the uncertain parameters are only known to reside in an uncertainty set or are governed by any probability distribution from…

We develop efficient algorithms to construct utility maximizing mechanisms in the presence of risk averse players (buyers and sellers) in Bayesian settings. We model risk aversion by a concave utility function, and players play…

We treat uncertain linear programming problems by utilizing the notion of weighted analytic centers and notions from the area of multi-criteria decision making. After introducing our approach, we develop interactive cutting-plane algorithms…

Online advertising has motivated interest in online selection problems. Displaying ads to the right users benefits both the platform (e.g., via pay-per-click) and the advertisers (by increasing their reach). In practice, not all users click…

A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is…

We study information design in multi-agent systems (MAS) with binary actions and strategic complementarities, where an external designer influences behavior only through signals. Agents play the smallest-equilibrium of the induced Bayesian…

In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender strategically discloses information to a receiver so as to persuade them to undertake desirable actions. Recently, a growing attention has been devoted to settings in which sender and receivers…

A monopolist seller of multiple goods screens a buyer whose type is initially unknown to both but drawn from a commonly known distribution. The buyer privately learns about his type via a signal. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism in…

Recommendation systems are widespread, and through customized recommendations, promise to match users with options they will like. To that end, data on engagement is collected and used. Most recommendation systems are ranking-based, where…

We study the design of information acquisition games-environments where a designer contracts their action on Sender's choice of experiment and the realized signals about some state-and identify which predictions can be made absent knowledge…

Persuasion is an important and yet complex aspect of human intelligence. When undertaken through dialogue, the deployment of good arguments, and therefore counterarguments, clearly has a significant effect on the ability to be successful in…

Modelling persuasion strategies as predictors of task outcome has several real-world applications and has received considerable attention from the computational linguistics community. However, previous research has failed to account for the…

This paper brings the novel idea of paying the utility to the winning agents in terms of some physical entity in cooperative communications. Our setting is a secret two-way communication channel where two transmitters exchange information…

While machine learning can accurately model process systems, models for decision making should also be structurally simple and physically interpretable. In process control, for example, (nearly) linear models are favored than nonlinear…

In this paper, we model a Stackelberg game in a simple Gaussian test channel where a human transmitter (leader) communicates a source message to a human receiver (follower). We model human decision making using prospect theory models…

Accurately modeling and verifying the correct operation of systems interacting in dynamic environments is challenging. By leveraging parametric uncertainty within the model description, one can relax the requirement to describe exactly the…

Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic interactions. Despite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to design information structures to ameliorate the overall experience…