Related papers: Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Appr…

Meta-training agents with memory has been shown to culminate in Bayes-optimal agents, which casts Bayes-optimality as the implicit solution to a numerical optimization problem rather than an explicit modeling assumption. Bayes-optimal…

We consider a setting of non-cooperative communication where a receiver wants to recover randomly generated sequences of symbols that are observed by a strategic sender. The sender aims to maximize an average utility that may not align with…

We study the classic principal-agent model when the signal observed by the principal is chosen by the agent. We fully characterize the optimal information structure from an agent's perspective in a general moral hazard setting with limited…

We study the general problem of Bayesian persuasion (optimal information design) with continuous actions and continuous state space in arbitrary dimensions. First, we show that with a finite signal space, the optimal information design is…

This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…

We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions. This problem generalizes the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework and…

We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…

In this paper, we study axiomatic foundations of Bayesian persuasion, where a principal (i.e., sender) delegates the task of choice making after informing a biased agent (i.e., receiver) about the payoff relevant uncertain state (see, e.g.,…

We present two methods for bounding the probabilities of benefit and harm under unmeasured confounding. The first method computes the (upper or lower) bound of either probability as a function of the observed data distribution and two…

In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does not. The informed…

We consider the fundamental scenario where a single item is to be sold to one of two agents. Both agents draw their valuation for the item from the same probability distribution. However, only one of them submits a bid to the mechanism. The…

In most social choice settings, the participating agents express their preferences over the different alternatives in the form of linear orderings. While this clearly simplifies preference elicitation, it inevitably leads to poor…

A sender first publicly commits to an experiment and then can privately run additional experiments and selectively disclose their outcomes to a receiver. The sender has private information about the maximal number of additional experiments…

Decision maker's preferences are often captured by some choice functions which are used to rank prospects. In this paper, we consider ambiguity in choice functions over a multi-attribute prospect space. Our main result is a robust…

In a variety of applications, an agent's success depends on the knowledge that an adversarial observer has or can gather about the agent's decisions. It is therefore desirable for the agent to achieve a task while reducing the ability of an…

This paper presents a novel approach for resilient distributed consensus in multiagent networks when dealing with adversarial agents imprecision in states observed by normal agents. Traditional resilient distributed consensus algorithms…

In this paper, we study the problem of secure transmission with covert requirement in untrusted relaying networks. Our considered system model consists of one source, one destination, one untrusted relay, and one Willie. The untrusted relay…

Evidence-based decision-making entails collecting (costly) observations about an underlying phenomenon of interest, and subsequently committing to an (informed) decision on the basis of accumulated evidence. In this setting, active sensing…

In data-driven inverse optimization an observer aims to learn the preferences of an agent who solves a parametric optimization problem depending on an exogenous signal. Thus, the observer seeks the agent's objective function that best…

We consider a distributed voting problem with a set of agents that are partitioned into disjoint groups and a set of obnoxious alternatives. Agents and alternatives are represented by points in a metric space. The goal is to compute the…