Related papers: PPAD-Complete Pure Approximate Nash Equilibria in …

We consider a repeated Matching Pennies game in which players have limited access to randomness. Playing the (unique) Nash equilibrium in this n-stage game requires n random bits. Can there be Nash equilibria that use less than n random…

We study equilibrium finding in polymatrix games under differential privacy constraints. Prior work in this area fails to achieve both high-accuracy equilibria and a low privacy budget. To better understand the fundamental limitations of…

In this paper, we aim to design a distributed approximate algorithm for seeking Nash equilibria of an aggregative game. Due to the local set constraints of each player, projectionbased algorithms have been widely employed for solving such…

In the framework of finite games in extensive form with perfect information and strict preferences, this paper introduces a new equilibrium concept: the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium (PPE). In the Nash paradigm, rational players consider…

We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria in concave games where the players' admissible strategies are subject to shared coupling constraints. Under playerwise concavity of constraints, we prove existence of Nash…

We study the optimization problem faced by a perfectly informed principal in a Bayesian game, who reveals information to the players about the state of nature to obtain a desirable equilibrium. This signaling problem is the natural design…

There has been substantial progress on finding game-theoretic equilibria. Most of that work has focused on games with finite, discrete action spaces. However, many games involving space, time, money, and other fine-grained quantities have…

This paper introduces a notion of weak solution for the coupled system of master equations in mean field games with a major player. It extends the previously introduced notion of Lipschitz solutions in mean field games. By relying on a…

In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix…

In the context of large population symmetric games, approximate Nash equilibria are introduced through equilibrium solutions of the corresponding mean field game in the sense that the individual gain from optimal unilateral deviation under…

We present a novel polynomial time approximation scheme for two-strategy anonymous games, in which the players' utility functions, although potentially different, do not differentiate among the identities of the other players. Our algorithm…

This paper studies the limits of empirical means of open-loop Nash equilibria of linear-quadratic stochastic differential games as the number of players goes to infinity, when the corresponding mean field game is of potential type and may…

We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a…

This paper is concerned with complexity theoretic aspects of a general formulation of quantum game theory that models strategic interactions among rational agents that process and exchange quantum information. In particular, we prove that…

In an epsilon-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most epsilon by changing his behaviour. Recent work has addressed the question of how best to compute epsilon-Nash equilibria, and for what values of epsilon a polynomial-time algorithm…

We present a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for computing $d^{d+o(d)}$-approximate (pure) Nash equilibria in (proportional sharing) weighted congestion games with polynomial cost functions of degree at most $d$. This is an…

We formulate two-party policy competition as a two-player non-cooperative game, generalizing Lin et al.'s work (2021). Each party selects a real-valued policy vector as its strategy from a compact subset of Euclidean space, and a voter's…

We study the computational complexity of decision problems about Nash equilibria in $m$-player games. Several such problems have recently been shown to be computationally equivalent to the decision problem for the existential theory of the…

Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…

Nash equilibrium} (NE) can be stated as a formal theorem on a multilinear form, free of game theory terminology. On the other hand, inspired by this formalism, we state and prove a {\it multilinear minimax theorem}, a generalization of von…