Related papers: Symmetric reduced form voting
Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding $k$ matchings fairly representing everyone's preferences. We model the problem as an approval-based multiwinner election where the set of…
We propose the variable selection procedure incorporating prior constraint information into lasso. The proposed procedure combines the sample and prior information, and selects significant variables for responses in a narrower region where…
Typical voting rules do not work well in settings with many candidates. If there are just several hundred candidates, then even a simple task such as choosing a top candidate becomes impractical. Motivated by the hope of developing group…
This paper proposes normative criteria for voting rules under uncertainty about individual preferences. The criteria emphasize the importance of responsiveness, i.e., the probability that the social outcome coincides with the realized…
We consider an ensemble of $2\times 2$ normal matrices with complex entries representing operators in the quantum mechanics of 2 - level parity-time reversal (PT) symmetric systems. The randomness of the ensemble is endowed by obtaining…
The problem of computing a common point that lies in the intersection of a finite number of closed convex sets, each known to one agent in a network, is studied. This issue, known as the distributed convex feasibility problem or the…
To select a subset of samples or "winners" from a population of candidates, order sampling [Rosen 1997] and the k-unit Myerson auction [Myerson 1981] share a common scheme: assign a (random) score to each candidate, then select the k…
Multi-winner voting rules based on approval ballots have received increased attention in recent years. In particular Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV) and its variants have been proposed. In this note, we show that the winning set can be…
We propose a new single-winner election method ("Schulze method") and prove that it satisfies many academic criteria (e.g. monotonicity, reversal symmetry, resolvability, independence of clones, Condorcet criterion, k-consistency,…
We propose a coupled rejection-sampling method for sampling from couplings of arbitrary distributions. The method relies on accepting or rejecting coupled samples coming from dominating marginals. Contrary to existing acceptance-rejection…
We consider settings where an allocation has to be chosen repeatedly, returns are unknown but can be learned, and decisions are subject to constraints. Our model covers two-sided and one-sided matching, even with complex constraints. We…
We propose two new alternating direction methods to solve "fully" nonsmooth constrained convex problems. Our algorithms have the best known worst-case iteration-complexity guarantee under mild assumptions for both the objective residual and…
This paper deals with the problem of robust matrix completion -- retrieving a low-rank matrix and a sparse matrix from the compressed counterpart of their superposition. Though seemingly not an unresolved issue, we point out that the…
In multiwinner approval elections with many candidates, voters may struggle to determine their preferences over the entire slate of candidates. It is therefore of interest to explore which (if any) fairness guarantees can be provided under…
In this paper we develop tools for studying limit theorems by means of convexity. We establish bounds for the discrepancy in total variation between probability measures $\mu$ and $\nu$ such that $\nu$ is log-concave with respect to $\mu$.…
We consider the problem of probabilistic allocation of objects under ordinal preferences. We devise an allocation mechanism, called the vigilant eating rule (VER), that applies to nearly arbitrary feasibility constraints. It is constrained…
In this paper we consider a distributed optimization scenario in which a set of agents has to solve a convex optimization problem with separable cost function, local constraint sets and a coupling inequality constraint. We propose a novel…
In the face of adverse motives, it is indispensable to achieve a consensus. Elections have been the canonical way by which modern democracy has operated since the 17th century. Nowadays, they regulate markets, provide an engine for modern…
Severe impossibility results restrict the design of strategyproof random assignment mechanisms, and trade-offs are necessary when aiming for more demanding efficiency requirements, such as ordinal or rank efficiency. We introduce hybrid…
We investigate a voting scenario with two groups of agents whose preferences depend on a ground truth that cannot be directly observed. The majority's preferences align with the ground truth, while the minorities disagree. Focusing on…