Related papers: Symmetric reduced form voting
We propose a new approach to sequential testing which is an adaptive (on-line) extension of the (off-line) framework developed in [10]. It relies upon testing of pairs of hypotheses in the case where each hypothesis states that the vector…
We introduce set risk measures (SRMs), real-valued maps defined on the family of non-empty closed bounded sets of essentially bounded random variables. SRMs extend traditional scalar risk measures by assigning a single capital requirement…
In computational social choice, the distortion of a voting rule quantifies the degree to which the rule overcomes limited preference information to select a socially desirable outcome. This concept has been investigated extensively, but…
We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. We propose a novel family of neutral and strategy-proof rules, which we call sequential unanimity rules. By demonstrating their formal equivalence to the M-winning…
Modeled along the truncated approach in Panigrahi (2016), selection-adjusted inference in a Bayesian regime is based on a selective posterior. Such a posterior is determined together by a generative model imposed on data and the selection…
Apportionment is the act of distributing the seats of a legislature among political parties (or states) in proportion to their vote shares (or populations). A famous impossibility by Balinski and Young (2001) shows that no apportionment…
We consider a committee voting on whether to adopt a reform under a quota rule, where members differ in how much they value the reform some supporting it, others opposing it. We examine how members can influence each other's votes through…
A canonical problem in social choice is how to aggregate ranked votes: given $n$ voters' rankings over $m$ candidates, what voting rule $f$ should we use to aggregate these votes into a single winner? One standard method for comparing…
In this paper, I introduce a novel stability axiom for stochastic voting rules, called self-equivalence, by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself will choose not to do so. I then show that under the…
We consider a setting with agents that have preferences over alternatives and are partitioned into disjoint districts. The goal is to choose one alternative as the winner using a mechanism which first decides a representative alternative…
We consider the problem of manipulation of elections using positional voting rules under Impartial Culture voter behaviour. We consider both the logical possibility of coalitional manipulation, and the number of voters that must be…
The Condorcet criterion (CC) is a classical and well-accepted criterion for voting. Unfortunately, it is incompatible with many other desiderata including participation (Par), half-way monotonicity (HM), Maskin monotonicity (MM), and…
Decision procedures aggregating the preferences of multiple agents can produce cycles and hence outcomes which have been described heuristically as `chaotic'. We make this description precise by constructing an explicit dynamical system…
To choose a suitable multiwinner voting rule is a hard and ambiguous task. Depending on the context, it varies widely what constitutes the choice of an ``optimal'' subset of alternatives. In this paper, we provide a quantitative analysis of…
Random projection algorithm is an iterative gradient method with random projections. Such an algorithm is of interest for constrained optimization when the constraint set is not known in advance or the projection operation on the whole…
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting…
We consider a variant of the randomly reinforced urn where more balls can be simultaneously drawn out and balls of different colors can be simultaneously added. More precisely, at each time-step, the conditional distribution of the number…
We characterise multi-candidate pure-strategy equilibria in the Hotelling-Downs spatial election model for the class of best-worst voting rules, in which each voter is endowed with both a positive and a negative vote, i.e., each voter can…
Positive semi-definite matrices commonly occur as normal matrices of least squares problems in statistics or as kernel matrices in machine learning and approximation theory. They are typically large and dense. Thus algorithms to solve…
Politics around the world exhibits increasing polarization, demonstrated in part by rigid voting configurations in institutions like legislatures or courts. A crux of polarization is separation along a unidimensional ideological axis, but…