Related papers: Symmetric reduced form voting
We consider a modification of the adaptive contact process which, interpreted in the context of opinion dynamics, breaks the symmetry of the coevolutionary voter model by assigning to each node type a different strategy to promote…
A new stochastic primal--dual algorithm for solving a composite optimization problem is proposed. It is assumed that all the functions/operators that enter the optimization problem are given as statistical expectations. These expectations…
In this paper we develop a novel approach to relaxing Arrow's axioms for voting rules, addressing a long-standing critique in social choice theory. Classical axioms (often styled as fairness axioms or fairness criteria) are assessed in a…
Two characterizations of the whole class of strategy-proof aggregation rules on rich domains of locally unimodal preorders in finite median join-semilattices are provided. In particular, it is shown that such a class consists precisely of…
I study symmetric competitions in which each player chooses an arbitrary distribution over a one-dimensional performance index, subject to a convex cost. I establish existence of a symmetric equilibrium, document various properties it must…
The problem of minimizing convex functionals of probability distributions is solved under the assumption that the density of every distribution is bounded from above and below. A system of sufficient and necessary first-order optimality…
Condorcet's paradox is a fundamental result in social choice theory which states that there exist elections in which, no matter which candidate wins, a majority of voters prefer a different candidate. In fact, even if we can select any $k$…
This study addresses a distributed optimization with a novel class of coupling of variables, called clique-wise coupling. A clique is a node set of a complete subgraph of an undirected graph. This setup is an extension of pairwise coupled…
We study alternating minimization for matrix completion in the simplest possible setting: completing a rank-one matrix from a revealed subset of the entries. We bound the asymptotic convergence rate by the variational characterization of…
A cyclic order may be thought of informally as a way to seat people around a table, perhaps for a game of chance or for dinner. Given a set of agents such as $\{A,B,C\}$, we can formalize this by defining a cyclic order as a permutation or…
We consider a resource allocation problem over an undirected network of agents, where edges of the network define communication links. The goal is to minimize the sum of agent-specific convex objective functions, while the agents' decisions…
We study quantum dichotomies and the resource theory of asymmetric distinguishability using a generalization of Strassen's theorem on preordered semirings. We find that an asymptotic variant of relative submajorization, defined on…
In Combinatorial Public Projects, there is a set of projects that may be undertaken, and a set of self-interested players with a stake in the set of projects chosen. A public planner must choose a subset of these projects, subject to a…
We study proportional representation in the framework of temporal voting with approval ballots. Prior work adapted basic proportional representation concepts -- justified representation (JR), proportional JR (PJR), and extended JR (EJR) --…
We study how electoral rules shape polarization dynamics when voters and candidates both adapt to repeated election outcomes. We introduce two geometric primitives for comparing rules under this feedback: the \emph{winner radius} $R_t =…
We study the probability that a given candidate is an alpha-winner, i.e. a candidate preferred to each other candidate j by a fraction alpha_j of the voters. This extends the classical notion of Condorcet winner, which corresponds to the…
We consider stochastic variational inequalities with monotone operators defined as the expected value of a random operator. We assume the feasible set is the intersection of a large family of convex sets. We propose a method that combines…
Divided Government is nowadays a common feature of the U.S. political system. The voters can cast partisan ballots for two political powers the executive (Presidential elections) and the legislative (the Congress election). Some recent…
In this paper, we develop a randomized algorithm and theory for learning a sparse model from large-scale and high-dimensional data, which is usually formulated as an empirical risk minimization problem with a sparsity-inducing regularizer.…
An important desideratum in approval-based multiwinner voting is proportionality. We study the problem of reconfiguring proportional committees: given two proportional committees, is there a transition path that consists only of…