Related papers: More can be better: An analysis of single-mutant f…
A stochastic evolutionary dynamics of two strategies given by 2 x 2 matrix games is studied in finite populations. We focus on stochastic properties of fixation: how a strategy represented by a single individual wins over the entire…
Evolutionary game dynamics with two 2-strategy games in a finite population has been investigated in this study. Traditionally, frequency-dependent evolutionary dynamics are modeled by deterministic replicator dynamics under the assumption…
The environment in which a population evolves can have a crucial impact on selection. We study evolutionary dynamics in finite populations of fixed size in a changing environment. The population dynamics are driven by birth and death…
We study evolutionary multi-player games in finite populations, subject to fluctuating environments. The population undergoes a birth-death process with absorbing states, and the environment follows a Markovian process, resulting in a…
Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations is known to fixate eventually in the absence of mutation. We here show that a similar phenomenon can be found in stochastic game dynamical batch learning, and investigate fixation in learning…
We investigate evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy matrix games with zealots in finite populations. Zealots are assumed to take either strategy regardless of the fitness. When the strategy selected by the zealots is the same, the fixation…
Evolutionary games on graphs describe how strategic interactions and population structure determine evolutionary success, quantified by the probability that a single mutant takes over a population. Graph structures, compared to the…
Convergence of discrete-time Markov chains with two timescales is a powerful tool to study stochastic evolutionary games in subdivided populations. Focusing on linear games within demes, convergence to a diffusion process for the strategy…
In evolutionary game dynamics, reproductive success increases with the performance in an evolutionary game. If strategy $A$ performs better than strategy $B$, strategy $A$ will spread in the population. Under stochastic dynamics, a single…
Understanding if and how mutants reach fixation in populations is an important question in evolutionary biology. We study the impact of population growth has on the success of mutants. To systematically understand the effects of growth we…
We study the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy ("cooperation" and "defection") games in populations comprising cooperation facilitators. The latter are individuals that…
In evolutionary game theory, an important measure of a mutant trait (strategy) is its ability to invade and take over an otherwise-monomorphic population. Typically, one quantifies the success of a mutant strategy via the probability that a…
We study large fluctuations in evolutionary games belonging to the coordination and anti-coordination classes. The dynamics of these games, modeling cooperation dilemmas, is characterized by a coexistence fixed point separating two…
The probability that the frequency of a particular trait will eventually become unity, the so-called fixation probability, is a central issue in the study of population evolution. Its computation, once we are given a stochastic finite…
We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-mixed populations of finite size, N. A well-mixed population means that any two individuals are equally likely to interact. In particular we consider the average abundances of two strategies, A…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…
One of the most striking effect of fluctuations in evolutionary game theory is the possibility for mutants to fixate (take over) an entire population. Here, we generalize a recent WKB-based theory to study fixation in evolutionary games…
We study evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. We analyze an evolutionary process, which we call pairwise comparison, for which we adopt the ubiquitous Fermi distribution function from statistical mechanics. The inverse…
Frequency dependent selection and demographic fluctuations play important roles in evolutionary and ecological processes. Under frequency dependent selection, the average fitness of the population may increase or decrease based on…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes the spreading of successful strategies in a population of reproducing individuals. Typically, the microscopic definition of strategy spreading is stochastic, such that the dynamics becomes deterministic…