Related papers: The Computational Complexity of Multi-player Conca…
In this article, we consider generalized Nash games where the associated constraint map is not necessarily self. The classical Nash equilibrium may not exist for such games and therefore we introduce the notion of best approximate solution…
Leveraging tools from the study of linear fractional transformations and algebraic Riccati equations, a local characterization of consistent conjectural variations equilibrium is given for two player games on continuous action spaces with…
Solving feedback Stackelberg games with nonlinear dynamics and coupled constraints, a common scenario in practice, presents significant challenges. This work introduces an efficient method for computing approximate local feedback…
Usually, to apply game-theoretic methods, we must specify utilities precisely, and we run the risk that the solutions we compute are not robust to errors in this specification. Ordinal games provide an attractive alternative: they require…
PPAD refers to a class of computational problems for which solutions are guaranteed to exist due to a specific combinatorial principle. The most well-known such problem is that of computing a Nash equilibrium of a game. Other examples…
Continuous-time empirical dynamic discrete choice games offer notable computational advantages over discrete-time models. This paper addresses remaining computational and econometric challenges to further improve both model solution and…
Suppose that an $m$-simplex is partitioned into $n$ convex regions having disjoint interiors and distinct labels, and we may learn the label of any point by querying it. The learning objective is to know, for any point in the simplex, a…
Concavity and its refinements underpin tractability in multiplayer games, where players independently choose actions to maximize their own payoffs which depend on other players' actions. In concave games, where players' strategy sets are…
In this article, we study a discounted stochastic game to model resource optimal intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks. To address the problem of uncertainties in various network parameters, we propose a globalized robust game…
We study the problem of computing a competitive equilibrium with approximately optimal bundles in Fisher markets with separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility functions, meaning that every buyer receives a $(1-\delta)$-optimal…
We study the equilibrium computation problem in the Fisher market model with constrained piecewise linear concave (PLC) utilities. This general class captures many well-studied special cases, including markets with PLC utilities, markets…
The rank of a bimatrix game (A,B) is defined as rank(A+B). Computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) of a rank-$0$, i.e., zero-sum game is equivalent to linear programming (von Neumann'28, Dantzig'51). In 2005, Kannan and Theobald gave an FPTAS for…
The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-criterion ranking): the number of alternatives that the players can always deal with rationally is less than this number. We comprehensively…
While discounted payoff games and classic games that reduce to them, like parity and mean-payoff games, are symmetric, their solutions are not. We have taken a fresh view on the properties that optimal solutions need to have, and devised a…
The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their…
The class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games,…
The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games; we close this fundamental gap in this paper. We first show…
This paper is concerned with complexity theoretic aspects of a general formulation of quantum game theory that models strategic interactions among rational agents that process and exchange quantum information. In particular, we prove that…
We study the computational complexity of computing or approximating a quasi-proper equilibrium for a given finite extensive form game of perfect recall. We show that the task of computing a symbolic quasi-proper equilibrium is…
This paper has two central aims: first, to provide simple conditions under which the generalized games in choice form and, consequently, the abstract economies, admit equilibrium; second, to study the solvability of several types of systems…